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This dissertation uses proprietary credit card data to investigate the impact of 
several shocks on consumer’s spending behaviors. The shocks studied consist of a 
regulatory shock initiated by the Korean government, an emotional shock from a 
human-made calamity, and a security shock stemming from a high-profile information 
security breach. Chapter 1 introduces the motivations behind this dissertation and 
gives a summary of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 discusses the regulatory shock. In South Korea, credit card holders 
can subscribe to a messaging service that sends a cell phone text message whenever a 
credit card purchase is made. Since September 2012, Korean policymakers have 
required that these text messages also include information on unpaid debt balances. 
Comparing credit card spending by users who subscribe to this messaging service and 
by users who do not shows that reminders of unpaid debt balances reduce credit card 
spending by 1%, past due balances by 0.5%, and installment purchases by 0.5%. 
These findings suggest that simple reminders of unpaid debt balances can lead to more 
responsible spending. 
Chapter 3 examines the effect of social grief on credit card spending. In April 
2014, a South Korean ferry carrying 476 people, mostly secondary school students 
from the city of Ansan, capsized, leading to 304 deaths in a disaster that devastated the 
entire country. This research finds that spending decreased dramatically after the 
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disaster, especially among people living in Ansan. These findings suggest that social 
grief can reduce consumer spending. 
Chapter 4 explores the effect of the high-profile information security breach on 
consumer credit card spending. On January 8, 2014, Korean regulators announced that 
the details of 104 million credit cards had been stolen, affecting nearly 20 million 
individuals. This research finds empirical evidence that such a massive information 
security breach increases the likelihood of account cancellation and reduces the use of 
the compromised credit card.  
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of main findings of the dissertation and 
suggests directions for future studies on consumer behavior. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
Credit cards provide a payment method that enables cardholders to pay 
merchants for goods and services without using money out of pocket. As well as 
convenience, credit cards offer an extra cash source for urgent financial needs and 
provide consumers with an easy way to track expenses. Being indebted is a long-
standing source of discomfort and even embarrassment, but this attitude is challenged 
by the consumer culture, an economy defined by the buying and spending of 
consumers. Consumer culture serves as a powerful force changing social attitudes 
toward debt as credit card debt becomes commonplace. In the United States, for 
example, credit card payments reached $33.8 billion in 2015, increasing steadily at an 
annual rate of 8.0 percent from 2012.
1
 
Social concerns, however, arise about whether credit cards encourage over-
indebtedness, especially among those least able to pay. Some studies show that 
consumers’ willingness to pay increases when using credit cards (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1998; Prelec & Simester, 2001). The widespread popularity of credit 
cards and growing concerns about debts emphasize the importance of understanding 
the role of credit cards in consumer behavior. Despite a sizeable literature on 
consumer behaviors, few studies use high-quality datasets to empirically investigate 
consumer behavior.  
This dissertation, therefore, offers several case studies from a unique dataset on 
credit card accounts and illustrates the impact of various environmental changes on 
consumer behavior. This study uses a proprietary dataset from one of Korea’s largest 
                                                 
1
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credit card issuers that contain a panel of thousands of individual credit card accounts. 
The case studies in this dissertation concern a regulatory shock caused by the Korean 
government, an emotional shock from a human-made calamity, and a security shock 
stemming from a high-profile information security breach. The case studies occur in 
natural settings; therefore, this dissertation provides empirical evidence to answer 
questions asked in real-life settings.  
Chapter 2 presents a study on government attempts to use nudges to influence 
debt control. This chapter focuses on whether increasing awareness of consumers’ 
unpaid debt balances reduces credit card debt. In this case, a nudge is given by text 
message reminders intended to encourage responsible spending behavior by 
consumers. In South Korea, credit card holders can sign up to receive instantaneous 
transaction alerts via text messages for a fee of less than $1 per month. To raise the 
limited self-awareness of credit card debt and to promote responsible spending 
behaviors, Korean policymakers in September 2012 required that the transaction alerts 
include information about unpaid debt balances. Before implementation of this policy, 
subscribers to the service (hereafter, SMS-users) received only transactional 
information, such as the sales total, purchase time, and vendor name. The new policy 
requires credit card companies to give SMS-users the option to receive free unpaid-
debt alerts at the bottom of the screen showing the transaction information.  
Using an account-level credit card dataset, this study examines the effect of 
unpaid debt reminders on credit card behavior, which includes credit card spending, 
past due balances, installment purchases, and the likelihood of accumulating past due 
balances. The behavior of SMS-users who receive unpaid debt reminders and those 
who do not subscribe to the service (hereafter, Non-SMS-users) is compared using two 
approaches: a regression model with fixed effects and difference-in-differences 
estimations. The regression model uses an original dataset and estimates a fixed-effect 
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regression, and a new dataset is constructed for the difference-in-differences 
estimations by matching and comparing the mean differences in credit card behaviors 
before and after September 2012. The results from both approaches suggest that 
reminding consumers about unpaid debt balances influences credit-card usage 
behaviors. Specifically, reminders of unpaid debt balances reduce credit card spending 
by 1 percent, past due balances by 0.2 percent, and the likelihood of past due balances 
by 0.3 percent. Moreover, reminders are especially effective for cardholders who have 
low credit scores. The findings offer a potential foundation to develop a nudge policy. 
While Chapter 2 focuses on government nudge policies, Chapter 3 presents a 
study on emotions and credit card spending, specifically examining the impact of the 
national tragedy on credit card spending. An event discussed in this chapter is the 
Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014, when a South Korean ferry carrying 476 people, 
mostly secondary school students from Ansan, capsized. Ultimately, 304 people died, 
and while the disaster devastated the entire country, it is hypothesized that: 1) the 
event caused especially high emotional distress in Ansan; and 2) this community 
distress is reflected in credit card spending, although the disaster caused little financial 
damage beyond the tragic loss of human life.  
This chapter investigates consumer reactions to the Sewol disaster and possible 
associations between changes in credit card consumption and physical proximity to the 
victims or their families. Zip codes in the dataset are used to locate cardholders’ 
residences at the sub-municipal level and categorize them by the distance to the 
victims’ residences. Fixed-effects regressions and difference-in-differences 
estimations find that after the ferry disaster, residents of the neighborhood of Ansan 
where the most victims lived reduced spending by 4 percent more than the rest of the 
country. People in the greater city of Ansan disproportionately decreased spending by 
1.6 percent. The observed reductions in spending are especially strong among women 
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and those in the age 40–50 years group. These results suggest that emotional distress 
can significantly dampen consumer sentiment and, consequently, consumer spending. 
This chapter also identifies consumers who react more sensitively to public disaster 
based on empirical evidence. These findings can help policymakers better prepare for 
future disasters.  
Chapter 4 studies consumer reactions to a high-profile information security 
breach. Today, many organizations collect and store customer data to provide more 
personalized services to customers. Customized approaches are especially important to 
increase credit card companies’ ability to achieve market competence. While 
understanding large volumes of customer data may enable companies to improve 
customer engagement, little is known about the actual outcomes when companies fail 
to protect customer information. However, data breach incidents are increasing 
worldwide, and some of the worst cases compromise the private information of 
millions of customers.  
Repeated security breaches and growing interest in the use of customer 
information lead to consideration of how customers react to security breaches. Chapter 
4 focuses on a major security breach among Korean credit card companies in 2014 
that was among the largest in the country’s history and affected more than 20 million 
cardholders in the country of 50 million. In January 2014, Korean regulators 
announced that an information technology worker had stolen the details of 20 million 
cardholders from three Korean credit card issuers (KB Financial Group, NongHyup 
Financial Group and Lotte Group) and sold the data to loan marketing companies. The 
stolen data included personal and financial information, such as names, residential 
addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, salaries, and credit card details.  
The proprietary data analyzed in this chapter come from one of three data-
leaked card issuers. Although the dataset does not indicate whose information was 
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breached, the announced number of affected users suggests that the majority of 
customers in the dataset were compromised. Comparing the behaviors of likely 
affected cardholders before and after the breach allows investigating changes in 
customer spending behaviors and the likelihood of account closure after major security 
breaches. These findings suggest that information security breaches motivate customer 
intention to leave compromised companies, and this trend persists for several months. 
Moreover, although some customers decide to stay, retaining accounts does not 
guarantee continued use of services because customers also reduce use of 
compromised credit cards after breaches.  
To confirm whether these changes in behaviors are related to the breach, an 
additional public dataset from Financial Statistics Information System is used. A 
fixed-effects regression model examining the credit card usage for 20 card issuers in 
Korea suggests a pronounced decrease in credit card usage among the data-leaked 
companies during the second quarter after the breach. The findings in this chapter 
contribute to the knowledge of security breaches and customer reactions to major 
security failures by particular companies, providing useful insights to policymakers 
and risk managers in credit card industries.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings and implications for each case study. 
This chapter also presents suggestions for future research and directions to extend 
work on consumer behavior.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EFFECT OF UNPAID DEBT REMINDERS ON CREDIT CARD BEHAVIORS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Household finances play an important role in driving economic growth (Mian 
& Sufi, 2009) as well as in explaining financial crises (Schularick & Taylor, 2012), so 
voluntary efforts undertaken by individuals to control their debt warrants attention. As 
is true in many other countries, the growing trend toward overuse of and defaulting on 
credit card debt has raised concerns in Korea involving the limited self-awareness that 
consumers seem to have regarding their credit card borrowing, calling for 
interventions to assist individuals who cannot manage their debt. 
To enable banks and other card-issuing companies to warn consumers about 
their unpaid debt, in September 2012 Korean policymakers made it possible for credit 
card users to use a credit card SMS (Short Message Service) to alert them of unpaid 
charges for which they are responsible. Before implementing the policy, credit card 
companies used SMS to prevent fraudulent charges for consumers who subscribed to 
the service, delivering transactional information such as sales totals, times of 
purchases, and vendor names. Whenever SMS-users swiped their credit cards, they 
received SMS-generated text messages along with transactional information delivered 
immediately to their mobile phones. The new policy required credit card companies to 
give users the option of receiving unpaid debt alerts at the bottom of the screen 
showing the other information. While this additional service would increase the cost of 
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providing SMS for credit card companies, it is free for users. This in effect turns a 
smartphone into a device capable of encouraging consumers to exercise debt control. 
Unpaid debt balances consist primarily of unpaid debt principal, such as the 
sum of unpaid debts from cash advances and unpaid balances following minimum 
payments, but exclude fees and interest. Unpaid debt balances differ from payments 
due in that unpaid debts include debts that must be repaid in the current month and 
accumulated debts deferred from previous billing periods, while payments due include 
the sum of debts within a billing cycle and a portion of deferred debts from previous 
billing periods. As such, unpaid debts are typically much higher than payments due for 
a given billing cycle. Moreover, while payments due statements indicate specific due 
dates for repayments and are subject to immediate collection, unpaid debt balances 
reported through the SMS do not have due dates and may take several months to be 
fully paid off. By highlighting the full debt owed, unpaid debt reminders are designed 
to maximize consumer anxiety about debt and eventually to induce consumers to 
reconsider their purchasing habits. 
Using an account-level credit card dataset, this chapter examines the effect of 
unpaid debt reminders on credit card user behaviors. I used credit card spending, past 
due balances, installment purchases, and the likelihood of accumulating past due 
balances as proxies for credit card user behaviors, and compared the behavior of SMS-
users who receive unpaid debt reminders with the behavior of Non-SMS-users who 
had never subscribed to an SMS. I find that, after receiving unpaid debt reminders, 
SMS-users spend on average 1% less than Non-SMS-users when using their credit 
cards. Moreover, unpaid debt reminders have a statistically significant effect on 
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reducing past due balances as well as on the use of installments, suggesting that a 
reminder reduces the tendency to procrastinate when making repayments. I also find 
that unpaid debt reminders are effective in reducing the likelihood of accumulating 
past due amounts. To confirm the reliability of my results, I estimate the mean 
difference-in-differences using a matched dataset. Before running the difference-in-
differences estimation, I construct a new data set to control for covariates. To observe 
similarities in the backgrounds of SMS-users and Non-SMS-users, I average five 
covariates—age, credit limits, spending, the number of uses, and uncharged debt 
balances—and estimate a propensity score, a single matching variable, using a probit 
model. I find that difference-in-differences results are consistent with my results using 
a fixed-effects regression model. 
 
II. Understanding the Behavior of SMS-Users 
While credit card policies have aimed to manage household debt by focusing 
on monetary measures designed to constrain consumer spending habits, such as 
tightening liquidity constraints and applying high interest rates, such measures do not 
directly treat consumer psychology as an antecedent of debt control. The prospect of 
having to pay a large debt produces anxiety (Drentea, 2000; Callender & Jackson, 
2005), and individuals have incentives to lessen anxiety, particularly if it damages 
their self-concepts (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The psychology underlying behavior 
associated with unpaid debt reminders is also understood in part as the result of a 
desire to minimize the threat posed by debt, of which consumers are continuously 
aware as they receive SMS text messages.  
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Responsiveness to information generally increases with salience (Klibanoff et 
al., 1998; Barber et al., 2005; Chetty et al., 2009). Salience is important in this study 
since reminders are less effective if the information they convey is not salient. I 
believe the unpaid debt reminders in this study are salient, for two reasons: 1) news 
about the unpaid debt reminder SMS policy appeared widely in newspapers when it 
became a default option for SMS-users, which makes it likely that consumers were 
aware of the policy; and 2) adding unpaid debt balances does not make an SMS text 
message complicated; information about unpaid debt balances is located at the end of 
a concise presentation of transactional information (shown in Figure1.1) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Before and After Unpaid Debt Reminders 
 
 
Although I am confident about the saliency of the debt reminders involved in 
this study, whether all consumers pay the same level of attention to SMS text 
messages is doubtful. Studies in the marketing literature increasingly note the 
effectiveness of repetitive advertisements in affecting consumer attention, attitudes, 
recall, and cognitive acceptance (Hutchinson & Alba, 1991; Winter, 1973; Craig et al., 
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1976; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979). Personal involvement with a brand is particularly 
important in terms of delaying the stage at which the effectiveness of repetition 
diminishes, or a wearout effect occurs (Campbell & Keller, 2003; Shiv et al., 1997). 
Although the unpaid debt reminders under this study are not advertisements per se, I 
believe that consumer responses to repetitive SMS messages should be similar to their 
reactions to repetitive advertising. In this regard, I capture my expectations in the 
following hypotheses: 
H0: Credit card spending, late payments, installment purchases, and the 
likelihood of accumulating past due payments will not change for SMS-users 
after receiving unpaid debt reminders. 
H1: Credit card spending, late payments, installment purchases, and the 
likelihood of accumulating past due payments will change for SMS-users after 
receiving unpaid debt reminders. 
This chapter suggests that reminders enhance cardholder welfare. Indeed, 
reminders are found to be effective in various domains, such as preventing bad habits 
(Koritzky & Yechiam, 2011), keeping appointments (Friman et al., 1985; Watanabe-
Rose & Sturmey, 2008), increasing daily activities (Schwerdtfeger et al., 2012), and 
driving people to vote (Dale & Strauss, 2009). This study also contributes to the extant 
literature that concentrates on the effects of reminders on changing individual 
behavior. The use of reminders, however, has been of little interest in consumer 
finance until recently, and to the best of my knowledge, no study has used empirical 
data to observe the effects of reminders on credit card behaviors. The rare exceptions 
consist mostly of studies in which the effects of reminders are examined in 
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experimental settings. For example, to compare the effect of a range of incentives on 
loan repayments in microfinance institutions, Cadena and Schoar (2011) conducted a 
field experiment wherein borrowers chose one of three treatments—cash rewards, 
interest rate reduction, or a monthly text message that remind them of payment due 
dates—and found that monthly reminders are as effective as 25 percent reductions in 
interest rates in terms of improving payment discipline. Moreover, Karlan et al. (2010) 
conducted a field experiment to investigate the effects of reminders on saving. To 
observe whether there exist distinctive outcomes that vary with message content, they 
sent two types of reminders, one with additional comments about future expenditure 
opportunities and the other without such comments, and found that people who receive 
the former message tend to save more than those receiving the latter message. Kast et 
al. (2014) also conducted a field experiment with micro-entrepreneurs to examine the 
effect of commitment devices on savings and used peer and feedback messages as 
treatments.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section III, I describe the data 
sources and regression variables. Section IV estimates the models and presents the 
results. SectionV tests for robustness, and Section VI concludes. 
 
III. Data Description 
3.1 Sources 
I obtained the data used in this chapter mainly from a large credit card 
company in Korea. My data include 13 million year-month observations provided by 
0.7 million cardholders whose last name is “Kim.” “Kim” is the most common 
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surname in Korea, which suggests that the behavior of the cardholders in this sample 
represents the behavior of Korean cardholders generally. Each account represents a 
single monthly statement for all cards issued by the company, as cardholders may own 
multiple credit cards from the same company. The sample period runs from January 
2012 through June 2013, which includes September 2012, when unpaid debt 
reminders were first implemented. To exclude inactive credit card holders, I consider 
only cardholders who spend more than ten dollars in each month of the study period. I 
also exclude cardholders who subscribed to SMS after September 2012. The age range 
of individuals in the sample runs from 18 to 80 years. The data form an unbalanced 
panel consisting of non-sensitive and non-traceable information about cardholders 
such as gender, age, credit limits, card spending, and past due balances. 
 
3.2. Regression Variables 
3.2.1. Credit Card Behavior Measures 
To measure cardholder behaviors, I use the following dependent variables: 
ln(Spending), ln(PastDue), Install_Use_Ratio and dPastDue. ln(Spending) represents 
the log of monthly spending plus one and consists of all transactions made with credit 
cards, including cash advances. ln(PastDue) represents the log of monthly past due 
balances plus one and consists of unpaid debt balances from previously charged debt 
including unpaid debt from cash advances, but does not include late fees or interest. 
Install_Use_Ratio represents the ratio of installment purchases to total credit card 
transactions and is used to understand the consumer habit of procrastination. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of monthly installment purchases by the number of 
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monthly credit card transactions. To count installment purchases, I add the number of 
uses of both revolving and installment credit. In Korea, cardholders are typically given 
two options for delaying payments, revolving credit and installment credit. While the 
former repayment method is a commitment made after consumption without 
promising a specific date for full redemption and the amount can vary from a 
minimum payment to a specific portion of the debt, the latter is a decision made before 
a purchase based on a consumer’s judgment regarding her financial condition and the 
amount of each monthly payment is the same over the period to which the consumer 
commits. Unlike in many other countries, where installment credit applies only to 
costly products such as cars and furniture, installment credit is quite prevalent in 
Korea to pay credit card debt ranging from $50 purchases to purchases of several 
thousand dollars, as long as credit allows. Lastly, dPastDue, used in a logistic 
regression, is a binary variable that equals one if a cardholder defaults on payments 
and zero otherwise. 
 
3.2.2. SMS-users vs. Non-SMS-users 
I segment cardholders into SMS-users, defined as cardholders who subscribe to 
SMS, and Non-SMS-users, defined as those who do not subscribe. SMS-users are able 
to pay less than one dollar per month for SMS and receive prompt text messages 
regarding their credit card transactions. Since 2012, these users have also received 
additional information in the form of unpaid debt reminders. I therefore classify a 
cardholder as an SMS-user if she has subscribed to the SMS and continues to receive 
SMS messages through the remainder of the study period, and as a Non-SMS-user if 
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she does not subscribe to the SMS. Since Non-SMS-users never subscribe to the SMS, 
they experience no SMS-related “shock.” The variable dSMS equals one for being an 
SMS-user and zero otherwise. The treatment is receiving an unpaid debt reminder, and 
the period is segmented by the application of the treatment. Therefore, pre-treatment is 
defined as the period before September 2012 and after-treatment is the period after 
September 2012. 
 
3.2.3. Other Regression Variables 
Additionally, I employ the following explanatory variables as controls: 
ln(Credit Limit), ln(Usage), lag_ln(Uncharged) and dSMS_Post. ln(Credit Limit) is 
the log of the credit limit plus one. A credit limit is assessed by the credit card 
company using internal and external sources to evaluate cardholders’ credit-
worthiness. ln(Usage) is the log of monthly usage of credit cards and 
lag_ln(Uncharged) is the log of the previous month’s uncharged debt balance. 
Assuming that a high level of unsettled debts can affect consumption, I use the 
previous month’s uncharged debt as a proxy for outstanding debt to distinguish the 
effects of reminders from the effects of debt outstanding. Uncharged debt is based on 
all transactions including revolving credit and debt accrued after a billing cycle; it 
does not include fees or past due balances. Although some portion of the outstanding 
debt is excluded, uncharged debt in general comprises a major portion of outstanding 
debt, which is likely to make it an effective measure of outstanding debt in 
determining credit behavior. Lastly, dSMS_Post is an interaction variable that equals 
one for SMS-users in after-treatment periods and zero otherwise. I also include time 
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and individual dummies to control for time trends and individual-specific 
characteristics. 
 
IV. Effects of Unpaid Debt Reminders 
In this section, I examine the effects of unpaid debt reminders using two 
approaches: a regression model with fixed effects and difference-in-differences 
estimations. For the regression model, I use an original dataset and estimate a fixed-
effect regression, and for the difference-in-differences estimations, I construct a new 
dataset using matching and compare the mean differences in credit card behaviors 
before and after September 2012. 
 
4.1. Fixed-Effects Regressions 
4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1.1, I present the descriptive statistics for cardholders in the sample. 
Each column in Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation for the entire sample 
population, Non-SMS-users, and SMS-users, respectively. Fraction Male indicates the 
ratio of male cardholders to female cardholders and Age represents the average age of 
cardholders within a range of 18 to 80 years. Holding Months represents how many 
months a consumer holds a credit card and Credit Limit($) is the average dollar 
amount of the credit limit that is assessed by the credit card company based on 
cardholders’ credibility. Monthly Usage is the average usage of credit cards per month 
and Monthly Install_Use_Ratio is the installment ratio calculated as the total number 
of installment purchases divided by the total number of credit card transactions. 
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Monthly Spending ($) is the average of monthly spending that covers cash advances 
and all transactions made by credit cards including revolving and installment credit 
purchases. Monthly Uncharged Debt ($) is the average monthly uncharged debt 
balance, which includes uncharged debts from all credit card transactions including 
revolving and installment credits but not including past due balances or fees. Monthly 
Revolving ($)>0 is a revolving debt balance that is greater than zero. Monthly Install 
Debt($) >0 is an average installment debt balance that is greater than zero, and 
Monthly Past Due($)>0 is the past due payment that is greater than zero. 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  All   Non-SMS-user   SMS-user 
   Number of Observation 13,186,702   1,416,252   11,770,450 
   Number of Individuals 745,020   79,753   665,267 
   Fraction of Male 0.52   0.54   0.52 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
   Age 44 11   53 11   43 10 
   Holding Months 17.7 1.31   17.8 1.23   17.7 1.33 
   Credit Limit ($) 6,061 4,834   6,049 4,972   6,062 4,817 
   Monthly Usage 18 16   12 12   18 17 
   Monthly Install_Use_Ratio 0.51 0.46   0.38 0.45   0.52 0.46 
   Monthly Spending ($) 975 1,374   847 1,299   990 1,382 
   Monthly Uncharged Debts ($) 1453 2,083   1283 2,094   1474 2,081 
   Monthly Revolving($)>0 753 1,057   580 864   767 1,069 
   Monthly Install Debt($) >0 507 820   466 736   512 828 
   Monthly Past Dues ($) >0 459 810   481 932   456 790 
 
Comparing the descriptive statistics for Non-SMS-users and SMS-users, I find 
that 89 percent of cardholders in the sample subscribed to SMS, as indicated by 
Number of Individuals (0.6 million for SMS-users vs. 0.08 million for Non-SMS-
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users). SMS-users in the sample are on average younger than Non-SMS-users (43 
years of age for SMS-user vs. 53 years of age for Non-SMS-users), which makes 
sense since younger people are in general more familiar with using cell phones and 
conducting financial activities over the Internet. There are no significant differences 
between SMS-users and Non-SMS-users in terms of Holding Months or Credit 
Limit—members of both groups have been using credit cards for more than a year 
with credit limits above $6,000. SMS-users, however, tend to swipe credit cards more 
often (18 times per month for SMS-users vs. 12 times per month for Non-SMS-users), 
allot more of their transactions to installment purchases (52% for SMS-users vs. 38% 
for Non-SMS-users), and spend more than Non-SMS-users ($990 for SMS-users vs. 
$847 for Non-SMS-users). Moreover, SMS-users tend to carry more uncharged debt 
($1,474 for SMS-users vs. $1,283 for Non-SMS-users), revolving balances ($767 for 
SMS-users vs. $580 for Non-SMS-users), and installment debt ($512 for SMS-users 
vs. $466 for Non-SMS-users). Regarding past due balances greater than zero, 
however, Non-SMS-users tend to carry more than SMS-users ($456 for SMS-users vs. 
$481 for Non-SMS-users). 
 
4.1.2. Fixed-Effects Regressions 
To estimate the effect of unpaid debt reminders, I use fixed-effect regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered by “mean credit card usage.” I calculated “mean credit 
card usage” by averaging a cardholder’s monthly credit card usage for the total study 
period (“number of swipes”) and save an integer of the average. The regression model 
takes the following form: 
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The dependent variable  measures the credit behavior of individual i at time 
t, and consists of four variables: ln(Spending), ln(PastDue), Install_Use_Ratio, and 
dPastDue. I use ln(Spending), ln(PastDue), and Install_Use_Ratio for the fixed-
effects regression, and dPastDue for the logistic regression with fixed effects. 
ln(Spending) and ln(PastDue) are calculated as the log of monthly card spending plus 
one and the log of monthly past due balances plus one, respectively. Install_Use_Ratio 
is calculated by dividing the sum of installment transactions by the total number of 
credit card transactions. dPastDue is a binary variable that equals one if the past due 
balance is greater than zero and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient  
indicates the effect of changes in credit limits ln(Credit Limit), the previous month’s 
uncharged debt lag_ln(Uncharged), and the number of credit card transactions 
ln(Usage). I was especially interested in the coefficient 𝛾1, which measures the effect 
of unpaid debt reminders on SMS-user behavior. I also control for seasonality and 
time trends with time dummies,  through . 
 
4.1.3. Results of Fixed-Effects Regressions 
Table 1.2 presents the results of fixed-effects regressions with t-statistics in 
parentheses. Results shown in column (1) show that credit card spending for SMS-
users decreases after receiving unpaid debt reminders, as denoted by a statistically 
significant coefficient of -0.010 (t-statistic = -5.04) in dSMS_Post. That is, receiving a 
reminder of unpaid debt balances corresponds to an expected decrease in spending of 
approximately 1 percent for SMS-users. Given that the average spending for SMS-
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users equals $990, this is equivalent to an approximately $120 decrease in yearly 
credit card spending per individual.  
 
Table 1.2: Results from Fixed-Effects Regressions 
  ln(Spending) ln(Past Due) Install_Use_Ratio dPastDue 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.161*** -0.022*** 0.017*** 0.006 0.000 
  (43.36) (-8.02) (15.29) (0.53) (0.51) 
ln(Usage) 0.985*** -0.005*** -0.021*** -0.042*** -0.003*** 
  (44.46) (-5.42) (-11.10) (-4.81) (-4.00) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.167*** 0.012*** 
  (15.73) (23.32) (11.33) (37.88) (10.03) 
dSMS_Post -0.010*** -0.002** -0.005*** -0.036* -0.003* 
  (-5.04) (-2.03) (-5.90) (-1.79) (-1.76) 
ln(Spending)   -0.013*** 0.030*** -0.246*** -0.018*** 
    (-15.14) (16.88) (-43.44) (-11.95) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2 0.407 0.002 0.022     
N 12.2mil 12.2mil 12.2mil 879000 879000 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with a statistical significance for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p <0.01 
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Column (2) shows that past due balances decrease with unpaid debt reminders, 
as shown by a statistically significant coefficient of -0.002 (t-statistic = -2.03) in 
dSMS_Post, which has the economic significance of a 0.2 percent decrease in past due 
balances. Moreover, as denoted by a statistically significant coefficient of -0.005 (t-
statistic = -5.90) in dSMS_Post, as shown in column (3), SMS-users tend to make 
proportionately fewer installment purchases, by 0.5 percent, after receiving unpaid 
debt reminders. I also present the results of the logistic regression in column (4) and 
the marginal effects in column (5), where I report the finding that unpaid debt 
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reminders have a significant effect on reducing the likelihood of accumulating past 
due balances. Specifically, after receiving unpaid debt reminders, the likelihood of 
accumulating past due balances decreases by 0.3 percent (t-statistic = -1.76) at the 10 
percent significance level. 
 
4.2. Difference-in–Differences Estimation 
4.2.1. Matching Method 
To confirm the reliability of my results, I estimate the mean difference-in 
differences using matched datasets. Before running the difference-in-differences 
estimation, I constructed a new dataset to control for covariates. To observe 
background similarities between SMS-users and Non-SMS-users, I averaged five 
covariates—age, credit limits, spending, number of transactions, and uncharged debt 
balances. Based on the averaged covariates, I estimated a propensity score, a single 
matching variable, using a probit model. After cardholders are assigned a propensity 
score, I matched SMS-users with Non-SMS-users who have the same propensity 
scores to five decimal places. The matching order is randomized and pairing groups 
are used more than once as a match. 
Table 1.3 presents the descriptive statistics after matching. As in Table 1.1, the 
columns in Table 1.3 show the mean and standard deviations for the entire sample 
population, Non-SMS-users, and SMS-users, respectively. After matching, the total 
number of individuals in the sample increases to one million, as half a million 
individuals each are assigned to the SMS-user and Non-SMS-user groups. Moreover, 
the means of the matched variables—age, credit limits, spending, number of 
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transactions, and uncharged debt balances for SMS-users and Non-SMS-users—all 
became similar after matching compared with the means shown in the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics after Matching 
 
  All   Non-SMS-user   SMS-user 
   Number of Observation 19,289,060   9,640,165   9,648,895 
   Number of Individuals 1,089,314   544,657   544,657 
   Fraction of Male 0.52   0.53   0.52 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
   Age 44 10   44 10   44 10 
   Holding Months 18 1   18 1   18 1 
   Credit Limit ($) 6,181 4,935   6,247 5,014   6,115 4,855 
   Monthly Usage 17 16   18 17   16 14 
   Monthly Install_Use_Ratio 0.47 0   0.42 0   0.52 0 
   Monthly Spending ($) 984 1,338   1,008 1,340   959 1,334 
   Monthly Uncharged Debts ($) 1,460 2,104   1,471 2,127   1,449 2,080 
   Monthly Revolving($)>0 735 1,000   743 964   729 1,026 
   Monthly Install Debt($) >0 498 778   486 720   510 831 
   Monthly Past Dues ($) >0 484 844   504 866   457 812 
 
The average age becomes 44 for both SMS-users and Non-SMS-users after 
matching. Moreover, Holding Months remains at 18 and Credit Limits($) stays above 
$6,000 for both groups. Non-SMS-users in the matched sample tend, however, to 
swipe credit cards more often (16 transactions for SMS-users vs. 18 for Non-SMS-
users), spend more money ($959 for SMS-users vs. $1,008 for Non-SMS-users), and 
carry higher uncharged debt balances ($1,449 for SMS-users vs. $1,471 for Non-SMS-
users). Nonetheless, SMS-users in the matched sample continue to make 
proportionately more installment purchases (52% for SMS-users vs. 42% for Non-
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SMS-users) and carry higher installment debt ($510 for SMS-users vs. $486 for Non-
SMS-users). Also, Non-SMS-users make more revolving credit transactions ($729 for 
SMS-users vs. $743 for Non-SMS-users) and carry higher past due balances ($457 for 
SMS-users vs. $504 for Non-SMS-users). 
 
4.2.2. Difference-in–Differences Estimations 
Using a matched dataset, I estimated difference-in-differences by taking the 
mean of credit card behaviors before and after the treatment. Let Ῡt be the mean of 
credit card behaviors and t be periods that equal 0 for the pre-treatment period and 1 
for the post-treatment period. Difference-in-differences takes the following form: 
 
In Table 1.4, I present the average of credit behaviors in period t in columns (i) 
and (ii) and the differences-in-differences estimations in column (iii). Each of Panels 
A, B and C shows average levels and changes in ln(Spending), ln(PastDue), and 
Install_Use_Ratio, respectively. For ln(Spending) in Panel A, I averaged the non-
missing values of ln(Spending) by t and dSMS, for SMS-users and Non-SMS-users, 
and subtracted the results shown in column (i) from the results shown in column (ii) to 
estimate difference-in-differences. Similarly, for ln(PastDue) in Panel B, I averaged 
ln(PastDue) among defaulters by t and dSMS, and subtracted the results shown in 
column (i) from the results shown in column (ii) to estimate difference-in-differences. 
To calculate Install_Use_Ratio in Panel C, I divided the sum of installment purchases 
by the total number of credit card transactions in each period. After calculating the 
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monthly ratio of installment purchases to total transactions, I averaged the total again 
by t and dSMS, and then subtracted the results shown in column (i) from the results 
shown in column (ii) to estimate difference-in-differences. 
 
Table 1.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
 
  Before Treat After Treat Difference 
  (i) (ii) (ii)-(i) 
Panel A: Average ln(Spending) 
SMS-User 13.202 13.174 -0.028*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Non-SMS-User 13.197 13.175 -0.022*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Difference 0.005*** -0.001*** -0.006*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Panel B: Average ln(Past Due) | Defaulters 
SMS-User 0.610 0.689 0.079*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
Non-SMS-User 0.656 0.738 0.082*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
Difference -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.003 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
Panel C: Average (Install_Use_Ratio) 
SMS-User 0.525 0.523 -0.002*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Non-SMS-User 0.421 0.428 0.007*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Difference 0.104*** 0.095*** -0.009*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Standard errors are shown in square brackets. 
 
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of difference-in-differences estimations. I 
find that my results are consistent with the results obtained from the regression model, 
as shown in Table 1.2. Specifically, Panel A shows that, after receiving unpaid debt 
reminders, average spending by SMS-users decreases by almost 1% relative to that of 
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Non-SMS-users, which in terms of economic significance equals the change in 
spending found in the regression model. Moreover, the relative decrease in changes of 
ln(Past Due) shown in column (iii) of Panel B and the relative decrease in changes of 
Install_Use_Ratio shown in a column (iii) of Panel C imply that unpaid debt 
reminders are helpful in reducing past due balances for those in danger of default as 
well as in weakening the tendency to delay payments. 
 
V. Robustness Tests  
In this section, I report the results of robustness tests I conducted to ensure that 
my results are not sensitive to alternative specifications. I use alternative periods, 
gender, credit score, and age, and examine fixed-effects regressions using robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by mean use of credit cards. In Appendix 1, I 
present the results of the robustness test. Results in Tables 1A and 1B show whether 
the results are consistent with those from using alternative periods. Thus I tested for 
the period running from July 2012 through December 2012 and also for the period 
running from April 2012 through March 2013. In Table 1A, the results for the 
dependent variable ln(Spending) are shown in the first column, the results for 
ln(PastDue) are shown in the second column, and the results for Install_Use_Ratio are 
shown in the third column. The results shown in Table 1A show that the degrees of the 
coefficients become larger as more time passes, suggesting that it takes some time 
until unpaid debt reminders take effect in changing credit behaviors. Table 1B exhibits 
the results from the logistic regression, and I find no significant effect of reminders on 
the likelihood of accumulating past due balances within a short time interval. As 
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shown in Tables 1C and 1D, I tested whether the results are differentiated by gender 
by segmenting cardholders by gender. Table 1C shows that male cardholders are more 
heavily swayed by unpaid debt reminders than females in terms of spending. That is, 
after being reminded about unpaid debt balances, men in my sample cut 1.3 percent of 
their spending whereas women on average reduced their spending by 0.7 percent. On 
the other hand, unpaid debt reminders enhance female cardholder welfare in terms of 
reducing past due balances and installment purchases. Moreover, as shown in Table 
1D, an unpaid debt reminder is effective only for females in terms of reducing the 
likelihood of accumulating past due balances, whereas it has no significant effect on 
male cardholders.  
As shown in Tables 1E and 1F, I tested whether the results are differentiated 
by credit score by grouping cardholders by credit score. Table 1E shows that an 
unpaid debt reminder helps in reducing spending by cardholders whose credit scores 
fall in the upper 10 percent by 1.7 percent. The second column in Table 1E also shows 
that it helps to reduce past due balances, by 1 percent, for cardholders whose credit 
scores fall in the lower 10 percent. Lastly, I compared the credit card behaviors of 
cardholders across generations and show the results in Tables 1G and 1H. For this test, 
I averaged the age of cardholders and into a 20s–30s age group, a 40s–50s age group, 
and a 60 or above age group. I found that cardholders in the 40s–50s age group are 
most heavily influenced by unpaid debt reminders in terms of reducing spending and 
delaying payments. There were, however, no significant effects on the likelihood of 
accumulating past due balances when the ages are segmented by generation. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the effect of a policy of sending unpaid debt 
reminders via SMS, which was designed to minimize the risk of overusing credit 
cards. Using fixed-effects regressions and difference-in-differences estimation, I found 
that a simple text message that highlights unpaid debt balances enhances the welfare 
of cardholders. To be precise, after being reminded of their unpaid debt balances, 
cardholders in my sample reduced credit card spending, incurred lower past due 
balances, and were less likely to delay payments. Although it takes some time until 
unpaid debt reminders take effect and change credit card behaviors, such reminders 
seem to motivate cardholders to exercise debt control, especially among females and 
cardholders in the 40s–50s age group. I provide no theory explaining these changes in 
cardholder behaviors, but unpaid debt reminders seem to deepen or intensify 
cardholder anxiety regarding excessive debt and therefore provide psychological 
pressure to avoid future repayments, which subsequently generates changes in credit 
card behaviors. 
The results reported in this study are, however, limited to active cardholders; 
inactive cardholders were excluded from the sample population. Determining whether 
consumers are active credit card users is based on the number of transactions and, to a 
certain extent, the ability to remember unpaid debt balances before making the next 
purchase, as reminders are sent to consumers after they swipe their credit cards. 
Although cardholders in my sample generate a relatively high level of repetition, 
repetition can be more widespread as individuals use other methods of payment such 
as cash. If individuals use credit cards only occasionally, the time intervals between 
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previous and following purchases are extended. In such cases, the effects of reminders 
can be counterintuitive, as the probability that limited memory hampers the 
effectiveness of the reminders increases. Further research should examine the 
behaviors of cardholders with other relevant characteristics. Moreover, policymakers 
should consider cardholder characteristics in designing reminders. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES 
 
Table 1A: Regression for Fixed-Effects Model by Month 
 
  Y=ln(Spending)   Y=ln(PastDue)   Y=Install_Use_Ratio 
  3 month 6 month   3 month 6 month   3 month 6 month 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.178*** 0.161***   -0.028*** 0.006*   0.009*** 0.014*** 
  (34.45) (44.17)   (-4.09) (1.82)   (10.15) (14.17) 
ln(Usage) 1.011*** 0.995***   -0.002* -0.003***   -0.021*** -0.021*** 
  (41.35) (42.87)   (-1.77) (-3.70)   (-11.55) (-11.03) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) -0.088*** -0.014***   0.010*** 0.011***   0.000 0.002*** 
  (-60.21) (-16.81)   (18.87) (24.79)   (1.46) (8.33) 
dSMS_Post -0.006*** -0.007***   -0.000 -0.001   -0.005*** -0.006*** 
  (-2.93) (-3.66)   (-0.09) (-1.06)   (-11.46) (-7.25) 
ln(Spending)       -0.013*** -0.012***   0.033*** 0.032*** 
        (-15.20) (-14.82)   (18.64) (17.32) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
r2 0.381 0.393   0.001 0.001   0.038 0.027 
N 4.4mil 8.7mil   4.4mil 8.7mil   4.4mil 8.7mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1B: Logistic Regression and Marginal Effect by Month 
 
  Y=dPastDue 
  3 month   6 month 
  logit dydx   logit dydx 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.015 0.001   0.181*** 0.035*** 
  (0.49) (0.45)   (8.68) (5.42) 
ln(Usage) 0.034* 0.003*   -0.014 -0.003 
  (1.93) -1.94   (-1.29) (-1.25) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.134*** 0.011***   0.148*** 0.029*** 
  (14.33) (4.15)   (26.07) (11.22) 
dSMS_Post -0.042 -0.003   -0.022 -0.004 
  (-1.20) (-1.16)   (-0.91) (-0.90) 
ln(Spending) -0.270*** -0.022***   -0.248*** -0.048*** 
  (-23.82) (-4.94)   (-34.37) (-14.25) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 0.2mil 0.2mil   0.5mil 0.5mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Table 1C: Regression for Fixed-Effects Model by Gender 
 
  Y=ln(Spending)   Y=ln(PastDue)   Y=Install_Use_Ratio 
  Male Female   Male Female   Male Female 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.156*** 0.167***   -0.026*** -0.019***   0.021*** 0.014*** 
  (38.24) (38.20)   (-6.05) (-4.96)   (14.26) (12.38) 
ln(Usage) 1.002*** 0.967***   -0.007*** -0.003**   -0.015*** -0.026*** 
  (45.04) (43.39)   (-7.28) (-2.57)   (-7.80) (-14.88) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.018*** 0.010***   0.013*** 0.014***   0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (19.00) (9.26)   (20.65) (24.31)   (11.56) (10.49) 
dSMS_Post -0.013*** -0.007***   -0.000 -0.003**   -0.005*** -0.006*** 
  (-5.66) (-3.12)   (-0.34) (-2.23)   (-5.18) (-5.41) 
ln(Spending)       -0.011*** -0.015***   0.025*** 0.036*** 
        (-12.54) (-15.07)   (15.18) (18.81) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
r2 0.418 0.395   0.002 0.002   0.019 0.027 
N 6.4mil 5.8mil   6.4mil 5.8mil   6.4mil 5.8mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1D: Logistic Regression and Marginal Effect by Gender 
 
  Y=dPastDue 
  Male   Female 
  logit dydx   logit dydx 
ln(Credit Limit) -0.006 0.000   0.022 0.002 
  (-0.34) (-0.35)   (1.29) (1.13) 
ln(Usage) -0.081*** -0.006***   -0.011 -0.001 
  (-6.11) (-4.19)   (-0.97) (-0.93) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.194*** 0.015***   0.145*** 0.011*** 
  (29.25) (7.05)   (24.56) (7.16) 
dSMS_Post 0.003 0.000   -0.066** -0.005** 
  (0.09) (0.09)   (-2.39) (-2.28) 
ln(Spending) -0.244*** -0.019***   -0.247*** -0.019*** 
  (-28.18) (-8.43)   (-32.95) (-8.55) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 0.4mil 0.4mil   0.5mil 0.5mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Table 1E: Regression for Fixed-Effects Model by Credit Score 
 
  Y=ln(Spending)   Y=ln(PastDue)   Y=Install_Use_Ratio 
  Percentile   Percentile   Percentile 
  Lower 10 Upper 10   Lower 10 Upper 10   Lower 10 Upper 10 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.198*** 0.134***   0.045*** -0.073***   0.012*** -0.000 
  (14.69) (10.68)   (5.16) (-3.23)   (8.14) (-0.00) 
ln(Usage) 0.941*** 1.002***   -0.016*** 0.001   -0.052*** -0.012*** 
  (38.86) (50.41)   (-5.52) (0.56)   (-18.12) (-11.61) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) -0.008** 0.045***   0.024*** 0.008***   0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (-2.29) (27.74)   (15.51) (12.24)   (7.68) (7.59) 
dSMS_Post -0.010** -0.017***   -0.010** -0.006**   -0.005*** -0.007*** 
  (-2.48) (-3.56)   (-2.19) (-2.12)   (-3.67) (-7.20) 
ln(Spending)       -0.044*** -0.008***   0.056*** 0.017*** 
        (-6.37) (-11.55)   (24.00) (22.09) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
r2 0.465 0.328   0.004 0.002   0.043 0.014 
N 1.2mil 1.3mil   1.2mil 1.3mil   1.2mil 1.3mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1F: Logistic Regression and Marginal Effect by Credit Score 
 
  Y=dPastDue 
  Percentile 
  Lower10   Upper10 
  logit dydx   logit dydx 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.295*** 0.023***   -0.097 -0.008*** 
  (10.05) (3.71)   (-1.54) (-3.17) 
ln(Usage) -0.095*** -0.007***   -0.005 -0.000 
  (-5.22) (-3.25)   (-0.13) (-0.13) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.104*** 0.008***   0.260*** 0.023* 
  (11.59) (4.69)   (11.83) (1.95) 
dSMS_Post -0.101** -0.008**   -0.042 -0.004 
  (-2.42) (-2.22)   (-0.50) (-0.49) 
ln(Spending) -0.360*** -0.028***   -0.242*** -0.021** 
  (-27.79) (-5.87)   (-10.97) (-2.14) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 0.2 mil 0.2 mil   40,924 40,924 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1G: Regression for Fixed-Effects Model by Age 
 
  Y= ln(Spending)   Y=ln(PastDue) 
  20-30s 40-50s 60s≤   20-30s 40-50s 60s≤ 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.169*** 0.156*** 0.149***   -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.015* 
  (52.20) (37.01) (12.76)   (-4.55) (-5.55) (-1.70) 
ln(Usage) 0.926*** 1.020*** 1.116***   -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
  (61.29) (42.26) (32.70)   (-5.08) (-2.77) (-2.22) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.004***   0.016*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
  (11.54) (14.05) (3.33)   (26.55) (27.20) (10.70) 
dSMS_Post -0.002 -0.017*** -0.014***   -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
  (-0.39) (-8.15) (-4.29)   (-0.65) (-1.34) (-0.24) 
ln(Spending)         -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
          (-17.44) (-16.10) (-7.92) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
r2 0.439 0.392 0.381   0.002 0.002 0.002 
N 4.8mil 6.3mil 1.2mil   4.8mil 6.3mil 1.2mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  Y=Install_Use_Ratio 
  20-30s 40-50s 60s≤ 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.004** 
  (14.90) (11.71) (2.58) 
ln(Usage) -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.040*** 
  (-12.56) (-9.38) (-18.69) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.007*** 0.002*** -0.000 
  (17.21) (11.88) (-0.85) 
dSMS_Post -0.004*** -0.007*** 0.001 
  (-2.68) (-6.79) (0.80) 
ln(Spending) 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.042*** 
  (18.41) (16.07) (19.25) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes Yes 
r2 0.018 0.023 0.052 
N 4.8mil 6.3mil 1.2mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1H: Logistic Regression and Marginal Effect by Age 
 
  Y=dPastDue 
  20-30s   40-50s   60s≤ 
  logit dydx   logit dydx   logit dydx 
ln(Credit Limit) 0.031* 0.001   -0.012 -0.001   -0.024 -0.003 
  (1.84) (1.52)   (-0.67) (-0.71)   (-0.38) (-0.43) 
ln(Usage) -0.025** -0.001*   -0.035*** -0.004**   -0.085** -0.009 
  (-2.07) (-1.83)   (-2.70) (-2.40)   (-2.24) (-1.55) 
lag_ln(Uncharged) 0.136*** 0.006***   0.196*** 0.022***   0.193*** 0.021** 
  (21.16) (6.40)   (30.18) (7.64)   (11.12) (2.44) 
dSMS_Post -0.005 -0.000   -0.004 -0.000   0.049 0.005 
  (-0.10) (-0.10)   (-0.16) (-0.16)   (0.87) (0.83) 
ln(Spending) -0.297*** -0.012***   -0.213*** -0.024***   -0.190*** -0.021*** 
  (-34.25) (-7.79)   (-26.52) (-9.04)   (-8.80) (-2.75) 
Individual  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 0.4mil 0.4mil   0.4mil 0.4mil   0.1mil 0.1mil 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SENSE OF COMMUNITY AND CREDIT CARD SPENDING: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE SEWOL FERRY DISASTER 
 
 
Do not forsake your friend and your father’s friend, and do not go to your brother’s 
house in the day of your calamity. Better is a neighbor who is near than a brother who 
is far away.  
(Proverbs 27:10) 
I. Introduction 
This chapter utilizes empirical observations on household credit-card spending 
to examine the effect of neighborhood affiliation on credit-card consumption in the 
aftermath of a tragic event. In an era in which anyone can encounter unexpected 
tragedies due to widespread terrorist attacks or natural disasters, costing precious 
human lives and taking financial tolls, the aftermaths of such incidents include 
collective mourning and concerns for those who experience the deaths of family 
members. Certainly, the painful transition and trauma after a tragic event are 
exceptionally harsh on victims and their families. 
In examining psychological reactions to terrorist attacks in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, Schlenger et al. (2002) demonstrated that 
those exposed to a traumatic event are at high risk of suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder. In Korea, one of the nation’s worst maritime disasters occurred in 
April 2014, and most of the 304 victims of the Sewol disaster were high school 
students. The entire nation was overwhelmed with grief and concern for the victims 
and their families, who were devastated and fragile. Whereas victims and families in 
deep mourning merit care and attention, relatively little attention has been paid to 
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understanding the grief transition that the general population, especially those in 
affected communities who commiserate with victims and victims’ families, 
experiences after a tragedy. In fact, people tend to share their emotions with others, 
and this sharing tends to be positively associated with physical proximity (LeBon, 
1985), group membership (Seger et al., 2009), and relationships between individuals 
(Hess & Fischer, 2013). In defining the attributes needed for building a sense of 
community, McMillan and Chavis (1986) suggested the importance of shared 
emotional connectedness, which can be facilitated by the frequency and quality of 
interactions. Sharing emotions with others can result in a convergence of emotions, as 
moods are transferred from person to person. Interactions in neighborhoods, schools, 
and workplaces increase closeness among individuals, simultaneously increasing the 
likelihood of influencing the attitudes and behaviors of others. 
In Korea, the Sewol disaster caused little financial damage amid the tragic loss 
of human life. Collectively, however, distressed emotions dragged on consumer 
sentiment. In the prevailing atmosphere of mourning, credit-card spending decreased 
significantly, as people canceled leisure activities, and companies postponed 
marketing activities. In the week following the sinking, credit-card consumption on 
apparel dropped by 4.3 percent and on leisure activities by 3.8 percent, compared with 
the same week in the previous year, according to the country’s credit finance 
association. Nevertheless, it is difficult to observe the direct effects of the tragedy at 
the aggregate level. For this reason, investigating consumer behavior at the individual 
level is important to understand the economic effects of the tragedy and to prepare for 
grief transition in the domain of consumer behavior.  
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Using account-level credit-card data, this chapter investigates the effects of a 
tragic event on consumption, as well as whether the physical distance between 
residences and victims matters in determining the effects on credit-card consumption. 
A regression model with fixed effects revealed that the Sewol disaster can be linked to 
a reduction in credit-card spending, on average, of 4 percent on the part of victims’ 
families or neighbors who lived closest to victims, and of 1.6 percent on the part of 
neighbors who lived in the same city as victims. Given that the average monthly 
spending by families and neighbors in close proximity was $561 before the tragedy, if 
we assume that the effect lasts for one year, it is equivalent to reducing annual 
spending by $269 per person. The reduction in spending was particularly significant 
among females and credit-card holders in the 40s–50s age group. 
 
II. The Sewol Disaster 
2.1. The Disaster 
On the morning of April 16, 2014, the Sewol sank off the southwestern coast of 
South Korea. The ship was carrying 476 passengers, including 325 secondary school 
students from Danwon High School who were on a field trip to the resort island of 
Jeju. Of these passengers, 172 were rescued, and 304 passengers and crew members 
died. The sinking’s principal, official cause cited was a sudden turn of the vessel, 
which became uncontrollable as the ship listed. Overloading and improper storage also 
elevated the danger of listing and capsizing.
2
 What devastated parents and the nation 
was the crew’s failure to evacuate passengers. As the ferry began sinking, the crew 
                                                 
2
 The Sewol was restricted to carrying a maximum of 987 tons of cargo, but sank with 3,608 tons on 
board. 
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repeatedly instructed passengers to remain in their cabins until rescuers could arrive. 
While passengers did as instructed, the captain and crew members fled the sinking 
ship. The broadcast revealed that crew members were among the first to be rescued, 
and that some were even holding beers while waiting to be rescued. Widespread 
criticism rained down not only on the crew, but also on the Korean government’s 
incompetent and lackluster rescue operation, sparking nationwide anger and grief and 
resulting in loss of trust in the government. Only passengers who jumped into the 
water or stayed near the top of the vessel survived, but most who stayed in the cabins 
perished. Meanwhile, victims’ families anxiously waited for word of their missing 
children at the harbor nearest to where the disaster occurred. Despite its failed rescue 
operations, the government provided neither a sincere apology nor an explanation of 
the systematic problems that led to the disaster. In the weeks and months following the 
disaster, citizens mourned collectively for the missing, and they collected donations 
for victims’ families. Yellow ribbons appeared all over the country as symbols of 
hope, with images spreading across social media. On the first anniversary of the Sewol 
disaster, the families and thousands of other citizens gathered for a rally to demand a 
full investigation of the disaster, as well as regulations to prevent future accidents. 
 
2.2. Understanding Affective States in a Neighborhood 
The unprecedented disaster elicited public trauma. In the aftermath of the 
disaster, keywords indicating emotional agitation -- such as “anger,” “suicide,” and 
“sadness” -- increased substantially on daily Twitter feeds (Woo et al., 2015). The act 
of sharing emotions occurred not only over social media, but also in the 
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neighborhoods where people consoled bereaved families. News reports indicated that, 
following the tragedy, post-traumatic stress disorder was found not only among 
survivors, but also among divers who conducted rescue operations and volunteers who 
helped devastated parents.
3
 Consequently, the sharing of emotions generated a 
convergence of emotions as the moods of presenters influenced the affective states of 
respondents, a phenomenon known as emotional contagion, “a process in which a 
person or group influences the behavior of another person or group through the 
conscious or unconscious induction of emotional states and behavioral attitudes” 
(Schoenewolf, 1990). Emotional contagion is a way of adapting to social information 
whereby people compare their moods with those of others’, then behave in what seems 
to be an acceptable way for a given situation (Nakahashi & Hisashi, 2015). Transfer of 
emotions is known to occur more often with negative than positive emotions, as 
people pay more attention to negative emotions that are often threat-related (Ö hman et 
al., 2001). Emotional contagion has been found in many experimental studies in which 
respondents mimic the facial expressions of presenters (Hess & Blairy, 2001), and it 
follows emotional states that are like those of presenters (Laird et al., 1994; Lundqvist 
& Dimberg, 1995; Neumann & Strack, 2000). As such, neighbors who are likely to 
encounter victims or their family members face-to-face are more likely influenced 
emotionally by the bereaved expressing their pain over losing children. 
Transfer of emotions has been recognized by many researchers. Schlenger et al. 
(2002) noted that those living in New York City during the 9/11 terrorist attack there 
tended to suffer more acutely from post-traumatic stress disorder than individuals 
                                                 
3
 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/06/116_207414.html 
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living in the rest of the country. Four years earlier, Bull et al. (2003) found an 
increasing pattern of service requests at grief-related organizations during the three 
weeks after Princess Diana’s death. Omdahl and O’Donnell (1999) used 
questionnaires administered to nurses at two hospitals on the emotional labor required 
of service providers. They examined whether empathy-related variables such as 
emotional contagion, empathic concerns for patients, and responsiveness in 
conversations contributed to nursing stress and burnout. They found that the 
combination of the three variables caused stress for nurses, and that emotional 
contagion, in particular, was the most significant predictor of emotional exhaustion. 
Several researches have found evidence of a carryover effect from emotions on 
consumption. For example, some studies have presented evidence that pleasant 
weather conditions can improve individuals’ self-assessments of mood – and can even 
influence tipping behavior at restaurants (Cunningham,1979; Rind & Strohmetz, 
2001). Cryder et al. (2008) demonstrated in an experiment that there is a positive 
relationship between sadness and the amount of money spent to purchase a commodity, 
and that this relationship is partly explained by a level of self-focus. In Korea, the 
Sewol disaster triggered emotional agitation in the public, which was subsequently 
reflected in dampened consumer sentiment.
4
 Although the disaster caused little 
financial damage amid the tragic loss of human life, collective emotional distress 
followed, dragging on consumer sentiment and thereby generating a potential threat to 
the economy. Indeed, the 9/11 terrorist attacks generated localized economic effects, 
especially in directly targeted areas such as New York City and Washington, D.C. 
                                                 
4
 http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/05/09/ferry-tragedy-hits-consumer-spending/ 
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(Makinen, 2002). Similarly, threats to the economy can be significant among 
neighbors who are likely to bond strongly with victims, then influence credit-card 
spending. In this chapter, I tested the following hypotheses: 
H0: Monthly credit-card spending and the amount spent per transaction will not 
change for the bereaved and neighbors after a disaster. 
H1: Monthly credit-card spending and the amount spent per transaction will change 
for the bereaved and neighbors after a disaster. 
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section III, I describe the data 
sources and regression variables. Section IV estimates the models and presents the 
results. Section V tests for robustness, and Section VI concludes the study. 
 
III. Data Description  
This study employs account-level credit-card data from a large card issuer in 
Korea from April 2013 through May 2014. The data include information on 1.6 
million accounts, for a total of 22.7 million year-month observations of credit-card 
behaviors, such as monthly credit-card spending, number of credit-card transactions, 
and balances of revolving credit. Due to computational difficulty, the study utilizes a 
large subset of individuals who share the most common surname in Korea, Kim, which 
generally accounts for 22% of all Korean households, according to the Korean 
Statistical Information Service. Because our data come from a large credit-card 
company, and cardholders are randomized by a common surname, individuals in our 
dataset should be representative of all cardholders in Korea. This study uses a subset 
of the original data by restricting the sample to cardholders whose total spending is 
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greater than zero and whose credit-card ownership extends past the date of the 
tragedy. Each account represents a single monthly statement for all cards issued by the 
company, as cardholders may own multiple cards from the same company. 
The sample data consist of three types of non-traceable cardholder information. 
First, there is transactional information for each cardholder that includes total balance, 
number of credit-card transactions, past due balance, revolving credit, installment 
credit, and outstanding debt. The card issuer has provided information by calendar 
month, which makes transactional information measured at month’s end available. 
Total balance is the debt principal, consisting of monthly credit-card transactions from 
purchases and cash advances. It is the closing balance at the end of each month and, 
therefore, differs from payment due. While payment due includes debt principal in the 
billing cycle, incurred interest fees, past due balances from previous billing periods, 
and a portion of debts from deferred debts, the total balance is the monthly debt 
principal, which does not include deferred debts or extra fees. Since mandatory fees 
incurred in payments due do not necessarily indicate voluntary cardholder spending, 
this study uses total balance as a measure of credit-card spending.  
The number of credit-card transactions indicates the number of monthly credit-
card purchases. Past due balance is the debt principal that has not been paid as of its 
due date. Cardholders have two options for carrying balances. The first involves 
revolving credit, in which payments are open-ended and decided at the time of 
payment. With revolving credit, the amount of the debt payment can be different each 
month. The second option is installment credit, in which payments are close-ended 
and decided at the time of purchase. To use installment credit, cardholders typically 
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set a specific time for full redemption and pay off a debt in equal amounts over the 
course of a set period. In many countries, installment credit takes the form of loans for 
large investments, such as auto loans and mortgages. In Korea, however, installment 
credit is widely used by cardholders for products with prices ranging from $100 to 
$1,000, thanks to competitive interest rates.
5
 
Outstanding debt consists of portions of the debt principal that are excluded 
from payments due in the current month and deferred through revolving or installment 
credit from previous billing periods.
6
 The data also contain cardholder credit limits 
that are observed by card issuers that use internal and external sources to evaluate 
cardholder credit-worthiness. Finally, the data include demographic information on 
cardholders such as gender, age, and postal codes. A postal code in South Korea 
typically consists of six digits:
7
 The first digit denotes the province, the second 
denotes indicates the city or county, the third denotes the district of the city, the fourth 
denotes the sub-municipal level of the city, and the rest denote the delivery address. 
To protect the identity of cardholders, however, the card issuer provided only up to 
five digits of postal codes, but this enabled me to determine and observe each 
cardholder’s city of residence. Although the sample data for this study provided very 
detailed tracking information pertaining to cardholders’ borrowing behaviors and an 
exceptionally large sample size, increasing the reliability of the results, they are 
subject to limitations. Because of the policy constraint, the card issuer restricted access 
                                                 
5
 Interest charges for installment credit range from 4% to 21%, whereas those for revolving credit range 
from 6% to 24% as of March 2016. It is also quite common for card issuers and affiliated merchants to 
offer interest-free installment plans for up to three months to boost sales.  
6
 Outstanding debt is uncharged debt by the end of a month and does not include past due balances.  
7 
It consisted of six digits until August 2015, then changed to five digits. 
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to some important information, such as cardholder income, marital status, and interest 
rates. Information regarding cardholder income can be particularly important, as 
changes in income can affect credit-card spending significantly. In this chapter, I used 
a fixed-effect model to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
 
IV. Methodology 
4.1. Cardholders in Three Areas 
This study investigates consumer reactions to an “exogenous shock,” the Sewol 
disaster, and measures how changes in credit-card consumption are associated with 
physical proximity to victims or their families. Using ZIP codes in the dataset, I found 
cardholder residences at the sub-municipal level and categorized them into three areas 
at the time of the disaster. The first area is the smallest sub-municipal level of a city, 
which I labeled Bereaved, where Danwon High School and the homes of missing 
students are located. The addresses of missing students can be inferred only from 
newspaper accounts, which reported that 149 students from the Bereaved area were 
missing following the disaster.
8
 Although victims may have lived in other locations as 
well, I believe that most victims lived in Bereaved for the following two reasons. First, 
students in general attend schools closest to their residences, so most of the students 
likely lived in or near the area where Danwon High is located.
9
 Second, among the 
261 missing students who were later found dead, more than half were reported as 
residing in Bereaved. Certainly, not all the cardholders living in Bereaved are families 
                                                 
8
 http://m.kyeongin.com/view.php?key=848801 
9
 There are 24 high schools in Ansan, the city where Bereaved is located. The area of the city is 58 
square miles, and there were 35,926 high school students as of 2010, according to the National 
Statistical Service. 
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of victims, but it is highly likely that most mourning families and neighbors lived in 
Bereaved. There are approximately 71,000 residents in an area of about 2 square 
miles.  
The second area, labeled Neighbor, is the City of Ansan, where Bereaved is 
located and where 695,000 residents live. The area of Neighbor is approximately 58 
square miles, in which 23 sub-municipal units exist, excluding Bereaved. Because 
Bereaved is located at the center of this city, Bereaved residents normally can reach 
any location in Neighbor in a 20-minute-or-shorter drive. Neighbor is located 
approximately 18 miles southwest of Seoul, South Korea’s capital. Locational 
advantage has made Neighbor a government-planned city designed to decentralize the 
population and factories that had been concentrated in the capital city. As such, the 
economy in Neighbor is driven mainly by manufacturing industries. The third area, 
labeled Distance, consists of neighboring communities and cities beyond Neighbor. It 
usually takes more than 20 minutes to drive from Bereaved to any location in 
Distance, which has an area of roughly 114 square miles. Figure 2.1 provides a 
description of each area. 
Figure 2.1: Description of Three Areas 
 
Area Description Details 
Miles 
from 
Bereaved 
Bereaved 
Cardholders in 
Bereaved 
2 smallest units near Danwon High 
school 
- 
Neighbor 
Cardholders in 
Neighbor 
City where Danwon High School is 
located 
≤ 10 
Distance 
Cardholders in 
Distance 
Neighboring districts and units 
beyond Neighbor 
10< x ≤ 20 
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4.2. Fixed-Effects Regressions 
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics on cardholders in the sample. Column 
(1) in Table 2.1 exhibits the mean and standard deviation for the entire sample 
population. The columns 2 to 4 display the means and standard deviations of 
cardholders who are segmented into the following three areas: Bereaved in column (2), 
Neighbor in column (3), and Distance in column (4). Others in column (5) reside 
elsewhere than Bereaved, Neighbor, or Distance. Panel A of Table 2.1 presents 
demographic information on cardholders, and panel B and panel C present the means 
of transactional information before and after the Sewol disaster, respectively. Gender 
indicates the ratio of male to female cardholders, and Age represents the average age 
of cardholders in the group. Credit Limit ($) is the average dollar amount of the credit 
limit provided by the card company, and Monthly Usage is the average number of 
credit-card swipes per month. Spending ($) is the average total balance per month and 
includes cash advances and all transactions involving a credit card. Cash Advance ($) 
is the average of monthly cash advances, and Install & Revolving ($) is the average of 
monthly credit-card spending, which cardholders assign to future repayment by using 
either revolving or installment credit. Outstanding Debt ($) consists of unpaid credit-
card debt, but does not include past due balances or fees. Past Due Balance ($) > 0 is 
the average of past due balances that are greater than zero.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
      By Area 
  All   Bereaved   Neighbor   Distance   Rest of the Country 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Panel (A). Demographic Information                 
Gender (male=1) 0.50   0.49   0.49   0.50   0.50 
  (0.5)   (0.5)   (0.5)   (0.5)   (0.5) 
Age 45.6   44.7   45.0   45.4   45.7 
  (11.8)   (11.2)   (11.1)   (11.5)   (11.8) 
Panel (B). Before Sewol Ferry Disaster                 
Credit Limit ($) 4,939   3,975   4,555   4,958   4,945 
  (4,402)   (3,344)   (3,890)   (4,268)   (4,413) 
Monthly Usage 11   9   11   12   11 
  (15.3)   (12.0)   (13.6)   (15.0)   (15.3) 
Spending ($) 614   561   619   621   614 
  (1,234)   (1,026)   (1,479)   (1,225)   (1,231) 
  - Cash Advance ($) 111   115   111   111   111 
  (588)   (470)   (548)   (569)   (589) 
  - Install & Revolving ($) 334   312   337   343   334 
  (844)   (635)   (775)   (799)   (847) 
Outstanding Debt ($) 969   964   1,000   984   968 
  (1,816)   (1,546)   (1,762)   (1,790)   (1,818) 
Past due Balance ($)>0 820   589   871   790   821 
  (1,786)   (1,119)   (1,779)   (1,913)   (1,783) 
Panel (C). After Sewol Ferry Disaster                 
Credit Limit ($) 4,917   3,961   4,525   4,932   4,923 
  (4,405)   (3,342)   (3,882)   (4,263)   (4,417) 
Monthly Usage 11   9   11   12   11 
  (15.5)   (12.8)   (14.1)   (15.4)   (15.5) 
Spending ($) 581   528   582   589   581 
  (1,236)   (974)   (1,153)   (1,202)   (1,239) 
  - Cash Advance ($) 103   112   102   103   103 
  (561)   (512)   (523)   (546)   (562) 
  - Install & Revolving ($) 310   285   312   319   309 
  (772)   (586)   (728)   (716)   (774) 
Outstanding Debt ($) 938   928   961   953   938 
  (1,823)   (1,553)   (1,711)   (1,795)   (1,826) 
Past-Due Balance ($)>0 955   738   993   880   957 
  (2,023)   (1,413)   (2,235)   (2,406)   (2,010) 
Number of Individuals 1,637,858   2,163   22,193   41,136   1,572,366 
Number of Observations 22,787,729   30,114   308,907   572,604   21,876,104 
 51 
 
 
Descriptive statistics shown in column (2) of Table 2.1 indicate that the credit-
card activities of cardholders in Bereaved tend to be at lower levels than those of 
cardholders in the rest of the country in terms of average credit limits ($3,975), 
monthly usage (9), and credit-card spending ($561). The disaster dampened consumer 
sentiment somewhat, as reflected in credit-card spending. Average spending decreased 
for the entire sample population from $614 to $581 (panel C in column [1]). Moreover, 
panel C in column (2) shows that the decrease in credit-card spending was 
substantially greater among cardholders in Bereaved (from $561 to $528) and 
cardholders in Neighbor (from $619 to $582). Changes in spending after the disaster 
were similar between cardholders in Distance (from $621 to $589) and others (from 
$614 to $581). 
  
4.2.2. Fixed-Effects Regression 
This study examined the effect of shared emotions on credit-card debt. Let Yit 
be the dependent variable for individual i at the end of month t. The model in this 
study used four dependent variables as measures of emotional changes following the 
disaster. The first dependent variable is the dollar amount of the total balance denoted 
as ln(Total Spending), which is the log-debt principal from purchases and cash 
advances. To specify the source of changes, I separated the components of ln(Total 
Spending) and used them as the second and third dependent variables. The second 
dependent variable considered the dollar amount of credit-card purchases, denoted as 
ln(Card), which is the log-debt principal from credit-card transactions, excluding cash 
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advances. The third dependent variable considered the dollar amount of cash 
advances, denoted as ln(Cash), which is the log-debt principal from cash advances, 
excluding credit-card transactions. Finally, there is log spending per usage, denoted as 
ln(Spending Per Swipe), which is the monthly credit-card balance divided by the 
number of uses. ln(Spending Per Swipe) shows the size per transaction—the higher the 
value, the more expensive the product. It demonstrates a cardholder’s tendency to buy 
expensive goods. Standard errors are clustered by mean credit-card usage, which is the 
average credit-card usage for the total study period. After averaging credit-card usage, 
I used an integer of a mean for clustering. All three dependent variables share the 
following regression model: 
 
 The regression model uses identical explanatory variables, Xit, which consist of 
the following four variables: (a) the log credit limit of cardholders, ln(Credit Limit); 
(b) the log number of monthly transactions, ln(Usage); (c) the log of the previous 
month’s outstanding debt, Lag_ln(Outstanding); and (d) the log of the past due 
balance ln(Past Due). The credit limit ranges from $0 to $200,000 and is provided by 
the card company, which uses internal and external sources to evaluate a cardholder’s 
credentials. Number of uses is the number of monthly credit-card transactions and 
includes purchases and cash advances. Lag outstanding debt is the previous month’s 
uncharged debt balance, a portion of which is rolled over into payments due the 
following month. Past due balances are unpaid debts that were charged for repayment 
within a certain date. Bereaved is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a cardholder lives 
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in Bereaved, the closest physical proximity to victims’ residences. Neighbor, a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a cardholder lives in Neighbor and zero otherwise, involves 
cardholders living in the same city as cardholders in Bereaved, but not in Bereaved. 
Distance, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a cardholder lives in Distance and zero 
otherwise, consists of cardholders who live in neighboring sub-municipal units or 
districts beyond Neighbor. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a transaction 
occurs after March 31, 2014, and zero otherwise. Because the card issuer has provided 
information by calendar month, Post may include some transactions that occurred 
before April 16, 2014, when the Sewol disaster took place. Individual and time 
dummies are included to control for individual heterogeneity and time trends. 
 
4.2.3. Results of Fixed-Effects Regressions 
This section presents the results of fixed-effects regression, with t-statistics in 
parentheses. The dependent variables are in column (1) of Table 2.2, ln(Total 
Spending); in column (2), ln(Card); in column (3), ln(Cash); and in column (4), 
ln(Spending Per Swipe). The results shown in column (1) indicate that, after the 
disaster, credit-card spending on the part of cardholders in Bereaved decreased by 4 
percent more than spending by cardholders in the rest of the country, as denoted by a 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.04 (t-statistics=-2.38) in Bereaved_Post. 
Average spending on the part of cardholders in Bereaved, which was $561 before the 
disaster, is equivalent to a reduction in annual spending of $269 per person. The effect 
of the disaster on credit-card spending became less acute among cardholders who live 
in the same city, by -1.7 percent, as denoted by a statistically significant coefficient of 
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-0.017 (t-statistics=-3.59) in Neighbor_Post. A negative coefficient of Neighbor_Post 
implies, however, that the affiliation from living in the same city somehow made 
people compassionate about their neighbors’ tragedies. Such affiliated compassion 
disappears for cardholders living in Distance, as denoted by a coefficient of -0.002 (t-
statistics=-0.35) in Distance_Post.  
 
Table 2.2: Results from Fixed-Effects Regression 
  
Y=ln(Total Spending) ln(Card) ln(Cash) ln(Spending Per Swipe) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.228*** 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.269*** 
  (11.06) (8.06) (15.81) (36.81) 
ln (Usage) 1.748*** 1.770*** 1.169*** 0.146*** 
  (12.71) (13.73) (38.67) (2.63) 
Lag ln (Outstanding) -0.006 -0.012** 0.048*** 0.007** 
  (-0.96) (-2.20) (10.71) (2.28) 
ln (Past Due) -0.036*** -0.019*** 0.011 -0.035*** 
  (-18.06) (-7.32) (0.89) (-37.45) 
Bereaved_Post -0.040** -0.048*** -0.013 -0.030** 
  (-2.38) (-3.43) (-0.38) (-2.20) 
Neighbor_Post -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.023* -0.013*** 
  (-3.59) (-4.91) (-1.85) (-3.21) 
Distance_Post -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.005 
  (-0.35) (-1.16) (1.02) (-1.30) 
r2 0.526 0.559 0.090 0.022 
N 18.5 mil 18.5 mil 18.5 mil 18.5 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses, with a statistical significance for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and 
p <0.01 denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Moreover, the results shown in column (2) indicate that the reduction in total 
spending was mainly in credit-card purchases, as denoted by a statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.048 (t-statistics=-3.43) in Bereaved_Post. It is, however, hard to tell 
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whether the tendency to withdraw cash also was affected by the disaster, as denoted by 
a coefficient of -0.013 (t-statistics=-0.38) in Bereaved_Post in column (3). Given that 
parents had to rush to the harbor nearest to the accident area, it is possible that their 
unexpected trips to the harbor caused them to withdraw cash for emergency purposes. 
For cardholders living in the same city, both credit-card spending and cash 
advances decreased substantially, with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.022 
(t-statistics=-4.91) for credit-card spending and -0.023 (t-statistics=-1.85) for cash 
advances in Neighbor_Post. In column (4), the results reveal that the tendency to 
purchase expensive goods also decreased by 3 percent among cardholders in Bereaved, 
denoted by a statistically significant coefficient of -0.030 (t-statistics=-2.20). Similarly, 
cardholders in Neighbor also cut their spending on expensive goods by 1.3 percent 
more than cardholders in the rest of the country, as denoted by a statistically 
significant coefficient of -0.013 (t-statistics=-3.21) in Neighbor_Post.  
 
4.3. Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
4.3.1. Matching Method 
In this section, I estimate the mean difference in differences using matched 
datasets. Before running the difference-in-differences estimations, I created three 
datasets based on five averaged covariates: age, credit limits, spending, number of 
transactions, and uncharged debt balances. After averaging the five covariates, I 
estimated a propensity score based on the average covariates using a probit model. 
Then I kept five decimal places of a propensity score and matched cardholders in 
Bereaved with those in Non-Bereaved who have the same propensity scores to five 
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decimal places for the first matched dataset. Bereaved is defined as the neighborhood 
located closest to victims’ residences, and Non-Bereaved includes the area outside of 
Bereaved. For the second dataset, I matched cardholders in Neighbor with cardholders 
in Non-Neighbor who have the same propensity scores to five decimal places. 
Neighbor is defined as the city of the victims’ residences, Ansan, but it does not 
include Bereaved, and Non-Neighbor is the area outside of Neighbor. Finally, for the 
third matched dataset, I matched cardholders in Distance with cardholders in Non-
Distance. Distance includes cities near Neighbor that are neither Bereaved nor 
Neighbor, and Non-Distance includes the rest of the country that is outside of 
Distance. The matching order is randomized, and pairing groups are used more than 
once as a match. 
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics after matching. Three columns show 
the means and standard deviations: the first column for Bereaved and Non-Bereaved, 
the second column for Neighbor and Non-Neighbor, and the third column for Distance 
and Non-Distance. As seen in Table 2.3, the means of the matched variables in 
particular — age, credit limits, spending, number of transactions, and uncharged debt 
balances — became similar after matching, compared with the means in the 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics after Matching 
  Bereaved 
Non-
Bereaved 
  Neighbor 
Non-
Neighbor 
  Distance 
Non-
Distance 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Gender (male=1) 0.50 0.49   0.50 0.49   0.50 0.49 
  (0.5) (0.5)   (0.5) (0.5)   (0.5) (0.5) 
Age 45.5 45.5   45.5 45.5   45.9 45.6 
  (10.9) (11.8)   (11.1) (11.8)   (11.7) (11.8) 
Credit Limit ($) 4,694 4,609   4,829 4,748   4,896 4,887 
  (3,715) (3,734)   (3,980) (3,956)   (4,225) (4,321) 
Monthly Usage 11 11   11 11   11 11 
  (13.3) (14.4)   (14.2) (14.9)   (14.0) (14.2) 
Spending ($) 600 579   600 583   583 584 
  (1,018) (1,117)   (1,055) (1,102)   (1,107) (1,101) 
  Cash Advance ($) 113 105   99 101   105 100 
  (485) (542)   (495) (518)   (525) (504) 
  Revolving ($) 309 294   316 299   320 321 
  (596) (724)   (699) (724)   (746) (773) 
Outstanding Debt($) 956 919   953 921   931 934 
  (1,484) (1,688)   (1,597) (1,665)   (1,710) (1,728) 
Past Due ($)>0 643 784   797 783   824 830 
  (1,208) (1,590)   (1,618) (1,679)   (2,083) (1,788) 
Number of 
Individuals 
1,590,810 1,590,810   1,591,825 1,591,825   1,585,632 1,585,632 
Number of Obs. 22,149,331 22,130,270   22,159,955 22,145,775   22,069,368 22,060,503 
 
4.3.2. Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
Using a matched dataset, I estimated difference in differences by taking the 
means of credit-card debt before and after the disaster. Dependent variables are the 
same as those used in the fixed-effects regression. Credit-card debt includes ln(Total 
Spending), ln(Card), ln(Cash), and ln(Spending Per Swipe). Let be the mean of 
credit-card debt and t be the periods that equal 0 for the pre-treatment period, with 1 
for the post-treatment period. AREA indicates Bereaved for the first dataset, Neighbor 
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for the second dataset, and Distance for the third dataset. There are three difference-in-
differences estimations taking the following form: 
 
In Table 2.4, I present results from difference-in-differences estimations in 
three columns: those for Bereaved and Non-Bereaved are shown in column (1), those 
for Neighbor and Non-Neighbor are shown in column (2), and those for Distance and 
Non-Distance are shown in column (3). In each main column, I present the average 
credit-card debt in period t in sub-columns (i) and (ii) and the difference-in-differences 
estimations in sub-column (iii). Panels A, B, C, and D display average levels and 
changes in ln(Total Spending), ln(Card), ln(Cash), and ln(Spending Per Swipe), 
respectively. For credit-card debt in each panel, I averaged the non-missing values of 
credit-card debt by t and AREA, and subtracted the results shown in column (i) from 
the results shown in column (ii) to estimate difference in differences. For example, for 
ln (Total Spending) in panel A, I averaged the non-missing values of ln(Total 
Spending) by t and AREA, then subtracted the results shown in column (i) from the 
results shown in column (ii) to estimate difference in differences. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of difference-in-differences estimations. I 
found that the overall economic significance in difference-in-differences estimations 
tended to diverge from that found in the regression model, but was consistent with that 
obtained from the regression model in terms of signs. Moreover, the results of 
difference-in-differences estimations revealed a clearer relationship between the effect 
of the disaster and the affiliations of those living near the victims. For example, panel 
A shows that, after the Sewol disaster, average total spending by cardholders in 
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Bereaved decreased by 1.1 percent relative to that of cardholders in Non-Bereaved, 
which was less than the 4 percent decrease in total spending found in the regression 
model. However, comparing the results shown in column (1) with those shown in 
column (2) and column (3) of panel A shows that the effect of the disaster on credit-
card spending weakens among cardholders who live in the same city, by -0.2 percent, 
and eventually becomes positive among cardholders who live in Distance. Similarly, 
panel B shows that, after the Sewol disaster, average credit-card spending by 
cardholders in Bereaved decreased by 1.2 percent relative to that of cardholders in 
Non-Bereaved, which is less than the 4.8 percent decrease in credit-card spending 
found in the regression model. However, comparing results shown in column (1) with 
those shown in column (3) of panel B reveals a strong positive trend in the relationship 
between the effect of the disaster and affiliation with victims. 
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
  Bereaved vs. Non-Bereaved   Neighbor vs. Non-Neighbor   Distance vs. Non-Distance 
    (1)       (2)       (3)   
  
Before Treat 
After 
Treat Difference 
  
Before Treat 
After 
Treat Difference 
  
Before Treat 
After 
Treat Difference 
  (i) (ii) (ii)-(i)   (i) (ii) (ii)-(i)   (i) (ii) (ii)-(i) 
Panel A: Average ln(Spending) 
Bereaved 4.738 4.535 -0.203*** Neighbor 4.668 4.475 -0.192*** Distance 4.559 4.376 -0.183*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Non-Bereaved 4.510 4.318 -0.192*** Non-Neighbor 4.526 4.335 -0.190*** Non-Distance 4.526 4.334 -0.192*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Difference 0.228*** 0.217*** -0.011*** Difference 0.142*** 0.140*** -0.002** Difference 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.009*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Panel B: Average ln(Card) 
Bereaved 4.554 4.361 -0.192*** Neighbor 4.514 4.328 -0.186*** Distance 4.400 4.227 -0.173*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Non-Bereaved 4.349 4.169 -0.180*** Non-Neighbor 4.367 4.188 -0.179*** Non-Distance 4.368 4.188 -0.181*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Difference 0.205*** 0.193*** -0.012*** Difference 0.148*** 0.140*** -0.007*** Difference 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.007*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Panel C: Average ln(Cash) 
Bereaved 1.471 1.378 -0.093*** Neighbor 1.229 1.141 -0.088*** Distance 1.141 1.078 -0.063*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Non-Bereaved 1.131 1.071 -0.060*** Non-Neighbor 1.121 1.062 -0.059*** Non-Distance 1.123 1.062 -0.061*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Difference 0.341*** 0.308 -0.033*** Difference 0.108*** 0.078*** -0.029*** Difference 0.018*** 0.016*** -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Panel D: Average ln(Spending Per Swipe) 
Bereaved 3.648 3.590 -0.058*** Neighbor 3.621 3.590 -0.031*** Distance 3.575 3.553 -0.021*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Non-Bereaved 3.597 3.583 -0.014*** Non-Neighbor 3.596 3.581 -0.015*** Non-Distance 3.602 3.587 -0.015*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Difference 0.050*** 0.007*** -0.043*** Difference 0.025*** 0.009*** -0.016*** Difference -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.006*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
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V. Robustness Tests 
 To ensure that the results shown in Table 2.2 are not sensitive to alternative 
specifications, Appendix 2 presents the results of robustness tests. I used alternative 
periods, gender, credit score, and age, then examined a fixed-effect regression with 
standard errors clustered by mean credit-card usage. After averaging the credit-card 
usage for the total study period, I used an integer of a mean for clustering. In Table 
2A, I present the results of the robustness tests specified by alternative periods. The 
results for the dependent variable ln(Spending) are shown in the first column, the 
results for ln(Card) are shown in the second column, the results for ln(Cash) are 
shown in the third column, and the results for ln(Spending Per Swipe) are shown in the 
fourth column. For this specification, I used the period running from October 2013 
through May 2014. The results in Table 2A show that the orders of the coefficients 
remained consistent between cardholders in Bereaved and those in Neighbor, in that 
credit-card spending decreased by 2.9 percent among the former and by 1.3 percent 
among the latter when compared with spending in the six months before the disaster. 
Results shown in columns (2) through (4) show that the orders of the coefficients 
remained consistent between cardholders in Bereaved and those in Neighbor when the 
dependent variable is ln(Card), ln(Cash), or ln(Spending per Swipe). Moreover, 
because my sample dataset contains information up to 1.5 months after the disaster, 
and because examining the persistence of the effect requires a longer duration, this 
study does not investigate the persistence of the effect, leaving that question to future 
research.  
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In Table 2B, I test whether the results are differentiated by gender by 
segmenting cardholders by gender. Results shown in Table 2B indicate that affective 
reactions in terms of credit-card spending occurred mostly in women. For example, 
column (1) of Table 2B shows that female cardholders in Bereaved cut their total 
spending by 6 percent more than female cardholders in the rest of the country, whereas 
it is hard to tell whether total spending for male cardholders in Bereaved was 
statistically different from that of male cardholders in the rest of the country. The 
gender differences shown in column (1) are partly explained by gender differences in 
coping with emotional distress, as found in previous research indicating that women 
tend to be more vulnerable to traumatic events or emotional distress than men (Olff et 
al., 2007). For cardholders living in the same city, however, the reduction in spending 
was similar for men and women, as indicated by statistically significant coefficients of 
-0.016 (t-statistics=-2.03) for men and -0.019 (t-statistics=-2.33) for women in 
Neighbor_Post. In Table 2C, I tested a specification by grouping cardholders by mean 
credit score. After averaging credit scores for the entire sample period, I segmented 
cardholders into the bottom 25th percentile and the top 25th percentile. Results shown 
in Table 2C indicate that total spending for cardholders in Neighbor whose average 
credit score is in the bottom 25th percentile tend to be more heavily swayed by the 
tragic event in the neighborhood than cardholders whose average credit score is in the 
top 25th percentile.  
Finally, I averaged the age of cardholders into a 20s–30s age group, a 40s–50s 
age group, and a 60-and-above age group, then compared the credit-card behaviors of 
cardholders across generations in Table 2D. Results shown in Table 2D indicate that 
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cardholders in Bereaved who are in the 40s–50s age group were most heavily 
influenced by the tragic event. Given that parents whose children are in high school 
are presumed to be, on average, in their 40s, a substantial reduction in spending on the 
part of members in the 40s–50s age group seems reasonable. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I found that the Sewol disaster caused negative emotions in the 
public that were simultaneously reflected in credit-card spending. The link between 
tragic events and credit-card spending was particularly strong among neighbors who 
lived near bereaved families, gradually attenuating among cardholders living at greater 
distances. This study suggests that substantial decreases in credit-card spending among 
the closest neighbors were in part due to neighborhood affiliations that generated 
transfer of sad emotions as neighbors interacted with the bereaved families. Moreover, 
the disaster affected not only the total amount of credit-card spending, but also the 
amount per transaction, suggesting that the tendency to buy expensive products also 
decreased due to the atmosphere of mourning. Additionally, a substantial reduction in 
credit-card spending among female neighbors revealed the likelihood that women are 
more vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder, which is consistent with previous 
research that investigates gender differences in stress disorders (Olff et al., 2007). The 
localized effects in the neighborhood following the disaster were also consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (Garner, 2002; Makinen, 2002). Whereas past studies 
focused on the effect of disasters in terms of psychological symptoms, consumer 
confidence, or economic effects at the aggregate level, this study explored the 
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economic effects at an individual level over time, allowing for a better understanding 
of behavioral dynamics in greater detail.  
Many studies also have noted that the economic effects of a disaster such as 
9/11 are short-lived (Garner, 2002; Makinen, 2002). However, the persistence of the 
effects following the Sewol disaster was not measured in this chapter due to limitations 
in the dataset, which opens up opportunities for future research. This study uses 
consumption patterns to measure emotional changes in the aftermath of the disaster. 
The findings reported in this study may help policymakers and marketers find a new 
methodology for measuring the prevalence of negative moods in the public. The Sewol 
disaster is an ongoing issue that requires attention and monitoring. Therefore, 
policymakers should recognize that the families of victims are not the only people who 
experience grief in the aftermath of a disaster. The public, especially neighbors who 
are affiliated with victims living nearby, may suffer greatly from the death of their 
neighbors. Ultimately, policymakers should find ways to help heal the wounds of 
those suffering. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES 
 
Table 2A: Regression for Fixed-Effect Model by Period 
 
  
Y=ln(Total Spending) ln (Card) ln (Cash) ln (Spending Per Swipe) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (Credit Limit) 
0.216*** 0.155*** 0.123*** 0.259*** 
  (9.98) (7.22) (43.73) (27.09) 
ln (Usage) 1.791*** 1.808*** 1.055*** 0.155*** 
  (12.83) (13.73) (39.84) (3.02) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) -0.057*** -0.053*** 0.037*** -0.048*** 
  (-8.31) (-8.61) (12.79) (-12.55) 
ln (Past Due) -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.008 -0.033*** 
  (-9.45) (-4.70) (-0.98) (-19.70) 
Bereaved_Post -0.029* -0.033** -0.005 -0.030** 
  (-1.72) (-2.53) (-0.17) (-2.46) 
Neighbor_Post -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.011*** 
  (-2.73) (-3.66) (-2.81) (-2.79) 
Distance_Post -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 
  (-0.81) (-1.06) (0.33) (-1.36) 
r2 0.507 0.540 0.085 0.020 
N 10.5 mil 10.5 mil 10.5 mil 10.5 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2B: Regression for Fixed Effect Model by Gender 
 
 
Y=ln(Total Spending) 
 
ln (Card) 
 
Male Female 
 
Male Female 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.227*** 0.228*** 
 
0.166*** 0.165*** 
 
(11.62) (10.54) 
 
(8.50) (7.67) 
ln (Usage) 1.734*** 1.761*** 
 
1.758*** 1.781*** 
 
(13.10) (12.35) 
 
(14.28) (13.23) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) 0.002 -0.014*** 
 
-0.007 -0.016*** 
 
(0.22) (-2.64) 
 
(-1.19) (-3.55) 
ln (Past Due) -0.042*** -0.032*** 
 
-0.023*** -0.016*** 
 
(-17.96) (-16.16) 
 
(-8.19) (-6.33) 
Bereaved_Post -0.020 -0.060*** 
 
-0.038 -0.057*** 
 
(-0.72) (-2.64) 
 
(-1.53) (-3.22) 
Neighbor_Post -0.016** -0.019** 
 
-0.015* -0.028*** 
 
(-2.03) (-2.33) 
 
(-1.85) (-3.75) 
Distance_Post -0.003 -0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.007 
 
(-0.39) (-0.11) 
 
(-0.30) (-1.25) 
r2 0.534 0.519 
 
0.566 0.553 
N 9.1 mil 9.2 mil 
 
9.1 mil 9.2 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed 
 
Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed 
 
Fixed Fixed 
 
 
ln (Cash) 
 
ln (Spending Per Swipe) 
 
Male Female 
 
Male Female 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.126*** 0.171*** 
 
0.267*** 0.269*** 
 
(10.27) (26.45) 
 
(36.39) (35.26) 
ln (Usage) 1.455*** 0.940*** 
 
0.152*** 0.140** 
 
(32.34) (40.17) 
 
(2.79) (2.48) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) 0.051*** 0.045*** 
 
0.015*** -0.002 
 
(11.75) (9.66) 
 
(3.93) (-0.90) 
ln (Past Due) 0.027* -0.003 
 
-0.040*** -0.030*** 
 
(1.77) (-0.38) 
 
(-31.16) (-27.93) 
Bereaved_Post 0.014 -0.044 
 
-0.023 -0.037 
 
(0.31) (-0.83) 
 
(-1.07) (-1.61) 
Neighbor_Post -0.043** -0.003 
 
-0.012* -0.015** 
 
(-2.60) (-0.22) 
 
(-1.78) (-2.45) 
Distance_Post 0.003 0.010 
 
0.001 -0.011* 
 
(0.27) (0.94) 
 
(0.12) (-1.84) 
r2 0.115 0.070 
 
0.027 0.018 
N 9.1 mil 9.2 mil 
 
8.6 mil 8.6 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed 
 
Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed 
 
Fixed Fixed 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2C: Regression for Fixed-Effect Model by Credit Score 
 
  Y=ln(Total Spending)   ln (Card) 
  Low25 High25   Low25 High25 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.187*** 0.285***   0.139*** 0.185*** 
  (8.89) (19.71)   (6.39) (10.31) 
ln (Usage) 1.878*** 1.640***   1.891*** 1.682*** 
  (12.20) (13.59)   (12.90) (15.04) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) -0.004 0.000   -0.003 -0.019*** 
  (-0.55) (0.09)   (-0.48) (-5.00) 
ln (Past Due) -0.035*** -0.040***   -0.023*** -0.012*** 
  (-12.55) (-15.46)   (-6.23) (-4.40) 
Bereaved_Post -0.027 -0.023   -0.033 -0.061 
  (-0.82) (-0.48)   (-0.87) (-1.49) 
Neighbor_Post -0.025** -0.002   -0.030*** -0.007 
  (-1.99) (-0.13)   (-2.72) (-0.61) 
Distance_Post 0.006 -0.003   0.002 -0.007 
  (0.59) (-0.39)   (0.21) (-0.88) 
r2 0.594 0.459   0.607 0.517 
N 4.1 mil 5.1 mil   4.1 mil 5.1 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed 
 
  ln (Cash)   ln (Spending Per Swipe) 
  Low25 High25   Low25 High25 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.152*** 0.135***   0.248*** 0.295*** 
  (15.98) (12.34)   (25.62) (37.82) 
ln (Usage) 1.232*** 1.253***   0.207*** 0.101** 
  (80.14) (26.71)   (2.98) (2.30) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) 0.034*** 0.079***   0.007** 0.012*** 
  (14.56) (13.28)   (2.24) (4.96) 
ln (Past Due) 0.039* -0.028***   -0.041*** -0.033*** 
  (1.81) (-7.54)   (-40.31) (-19.67) 
Bereaved_Post -0.029 -0.144   -0.008 -0.024 
  (-0.36) (-1.40)   (-0.25) (-0.61) 
Neighbor_Post -0.074*** -0.042*   -0.016 -0.006 
  (-2.91) (-1.68)   (-1.16) (-0.55) 
Distance_Post 0.021 0.006   -0.004 -0.011* 
  (1.05) (0.30)   (-0.58) (-1.75) 
r2 0.095 0.099   0.050 0.009 
N 4.1 mil 5.1 mil   3.6 mil 4.9 mil 
Individual Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2D: Regression for Fixed-Effect Model by Age 
 
  Y=ln(Total Spending)   ln (Card) 
  20s-30s 40s-50s 60s ≤   20s-30s 40s-50s 60s ≤ 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.230*** 0.233*** 0.203***   0.178*** 0.164*** 0.129*** 
  (12.14) (10.95) (8.90)   (9.08) (7.96) (6.25) 
ln (Usage) 1.615*** 1.795*** 2.021***   1.635*** 1.820*** 2.034*** 
  (14.46) (12.50) (10.65)   (15.33) (13.64) (11.69) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) 0.000 -0.002 -0.034***   -0.002 -0.010* -0.039*** 
  (0.01) (-0.33) (-3.43)   (-0.54) (-1.74) (-4.53) 
ln (Past Due) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.045***   -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
  (-13.19) (-24.87) (-17.90)   (-8.02) (-8.29) (-5.82) 
Bereaved_Post -0.023 -0.048** -0.028   -0.034 -0.047** -0.069 
  (-0.78) (-2.00) (-0.62)   (-1.09) (-2.26) (-1.24) 
Neighbor_Post -0.026*** -0.006 -0.030   -0.029*** -0.012* -0.028 
  (-3.41) (-0.75) (-1.04)   (-3.77) (-1.71) (-1.25) 
Distance_Post -0.004 -0.003 0.005   -0.007 -0.007 0.009 
  (-0.55) (-0.42) (0.32)   (-0.95) (-1.29) (0.58) 
r2 0.534 0.522 0.544   0.563 0.559 0.572 
N 6.42e+06 9.89e+06 2.18e+06   6.42e+06 9.89e+06 2.18e+06 
Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed Fixed 
 
  ln (Cash)   ln (Spending Per Swipe) 
  20s-30s 40s-50s 60s ≤   20s-30s 40s-50s 60s ≤ 
ln (Credit Limit) 0.130*** 0.158*** 0.174***   0.261*** 0.277*** 0.239*** 
  (11.57) (18.46) (15.13)   (33.35) (33.51) (45.07) 
ln (Usage) 1.158*** 1.204*** 1.014***   0.075* 0.189*** 0.210*** 
  (58.29) (33.07) (24.44)   (1.72) (3.02) (3.41) 
lag_ln (Outstanding) 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.037***   0.016*** 0.009** -0.026*** 
  (10.73) (11.09) (8.24)   (9.51) (2.32) (-3.45) 
ln (Past Due) 0.015 0.011 -0.012   -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.037*** 
  (1.38) (0.79) (-1.20)   (-30.04) (-34.01) (-14.80) 
Bereaved_Post -0.035 -0.005 0.016   -0.023 -0.029* -0.042 
  (-0.52) (-0.13) (0.20)   (-1.12) (-1.67) (-1.01) 
Neighbor_Post -0.028 -0.016 -0.046   -0.022*** -0.003 -0.013 
  (-1.32) (-1.08) (-1.45)   (-3.38) (-0.46) (-0.60) 
Distance_Post 0.010 0.008 -0.000   -0.006 -0.006 0.004 
  (0.60) (0.74) (-0.00)   (-0.79) (-1.29) (0.23) 
r2 0.086 0.093 0.086   0.020 0.027 0.020 
N 6.42e+06 9.89e+06 2.18e+06   5.98e+06 9.23e+06 1.99e+06 
Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Time Fixed Fixed Fixed   Fixed Fixed Fixed 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INFORMATION-SECURITY BREACHES AND CREDIT-CARD SPENDING 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Businesses today utilize rich, abundant, available data to provide tailored 
services to customers. The credit-card industry’s strategy in particular relies heavily 
on large-scale customer information. To increase opportunities for market competence 
and to understand customers’ lifestyles, credit-card companies collect massive 
amounts of information and analyze customers’ spending behaviors, such as the goods 
they purchase, the restaurants where they eat, and the places where they travel. Amid 
the fast-growing appetite for Big Data in the marketplace, the increased use of 
customer data inevitably raises concerns regarding cybersecurity and customer 
privacy. In the U.S., massive customer-information breaches have been uncomfortably 
common, and the personal information of nearly half of U.S. adults has been hacked 
since 2014.
10
  
Although incidents of customer-data breaches are burgeoning and pose great 
challenges worldwide, limited research has been done on subsequent customer 
behaviors after a breach. Previous studies mostly focus on stock-market reactions to 
customer-data breaches, which generally, although not always, have temporary 
negative effects on companies’ market values (Campbell et al., 2003). While investors 
often represent customers of breached companies, and investors’ reactions may reflect 
a particular consequence of such incidents, they do not fully capture the actual 
                                                 
10
 http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/ 
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behaviors of affected customers. The rationale for investing in a company is not 
always the same as the rationale for being a customer of that company. Individuals 
may continue investing in a breached company even after deciding not to be customers 
anymore. Customers’ behavioral reactions to data breaches indicate a loss of customer 
confidence, an intangible cost that is difficult to perceive in investors’ reactions, but 
permanently affects firms’ future cash flow. Moreover, many studies rely on survey 
data from small samples, which might produce biased results.  
This study uses a large amount of credit-card data to investigate the effects of 
security failures on companies’ customer bases and customers’ use of compromised 
credit cards after information-security breaches. The event studied in this chapter is a 
major security breach at Korean credit-card companies in 2014. By analyzing the 
spending behaviors of cardholders with compromised card data, this study is intended 
to answer the following questions: How do information-security breaches influence 
individuals’ likelihood of closing compromised accounts? How do information-
security breaches influence the spending behaviors of cardholders who keep 
compromised accounts? How does past experience with compromised credit cards 
influence future usage of them?  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe 
the security-failure incident among Korean card issuers. In the third section, I review 
relevant previous studies and develop research hypotheses, and in the fourth section, I 
present the dataset used in this chapter. The fifth section discusses the research 
methodology, the sixth section reports the results of the empirical analysis, and the 
final section presents the conclusions. 
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2. Information Security Breach 
On January 8, 2014, Korean regulators announced that the details of 104 
million credit cards in Korea had been stolen by an information-technology (IT) 
worker at the Korea Credit Bureau, which serves South Korea. The worker secretly 
copied customer information from credit cards issued by KB Financial Group, Lotte 
Card, and Nonghyup Financial Group onto a USB stick between October 2012 and 
December 2013, then sold the information to loan-marketing firms. The three credit-
card issuers were unaware of the breach until the regulators publicly announced the 
theft. Prosecutors announced that when considering individuals who had multiple 
credit cards, nearly 20 million individuals were affected by the breach. The un-
encrypted data included crucial customer information, including names, residential 
addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, salaries, and credit-card details. 
The managers of the three credit-card issuers released public apologies and offered 
their resignations for their failure to prevent the massive customer-data breach. 
Prosecutors fined the three credit-card issuers KRW 6 million (approximately US 
$5,500) and banned the three card issuers from issuing credit cards to new customers 
for three months.
11
 While credit-card companies were obliged to compensate 
customers for personal financial losses due to the breach, financial authorities assured 
that they found no evidence that the data were misused. However, angry and worried 
customers rushed to the companies’ branches, contacted their call centers, and visited 
company websites to inquire whether their data had been stolen. As a result, nearly 
                                                 
11
 The suspension lasted from February 17, 2014 to May 16, 2014. 
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2.63 million customers of the three card issuers cancelled their credit cards, while 4.31 
million demanded that their cards be reissued.
12
 The issue of this breach resurfaced in 
March 2014 when financial authorities overturned their previous announcement and 
publicized a third-party leak. It was discovered that the personal information of 
millions of card holders had been sold to loan-marketing dealers.  
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Previous studies report mixed outcomes from examining market responses to 
announcements of information-security breaches. Garg et al. (2003) used an event-
study methodology and found an average loss of 5.6 percent in stock prices from 22 
such events in 1996 and 2002. Garg et al. (2003) further investigated the heterogeneity 
in investors’ reactions to different types of events and found that among events 
involving denial of services, website defacement, or theft of credit-card information, 
investors’ reactions to the loss of credit-card information through market activity is 
exceptionally costly, amounting to a 15 percent drop in stock prices over the three 
days following events. Campbell et al. (2003), however, found limited evidence of an 
overall negative effect on stock value. However, they examined different types of 
breaches and found that the negative effects after announcements become significant 
when security breaches violated customer confidentiality. Campbell et al. (2003) 
found no significant impact when the damage was limited to technical problems. 
Moreover, Kannan et al. (2007) investigated whether impacts from security breaches 
varied by company size or time period studied. Kannan et al. (2007) found that market 
                                                 
12
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-02/south-korea-to-suspend-3-credit-card-firms-
over-data-theft 
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reactions to announcements of security breaches neither differed by firm size, nor 
persisted in the long term. Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) specifically looked at the 
effect of security breaches resulting in losses of customers’ private information and 
found a drop of 3 percent in stock value after announcements. The loss is greater 
among large firms, and the gap with small firms becomes significant as the number of 
affected individuals increases.   
Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) also noted that the loss of customer information 
was a type of service failure because the breached company failed to protect 
customers’ private information. Customer service is a key determinant of customer 
satisfaction and market competitiveness, and severe service failures create customer 
dissatisfaction, provoking negative emotions and eliciting negative impressions of 
companies. Emotions tend to play a pivotal role in influencing individuals’ decision-
making and judgment, and negative emotions can result in customer “grudge-holding” 
behaviors against companies, such as complaining (Blodgett et al., 1995; Kim et al., 
2003), disseminating negative word-of-mouth (Tsai et al., 2014), reducing interactions 
with companies (Bunker & Ball, 2008), and exiting the customer relationship (Haj-
Salem & Chebat, 2013; Singh, 1990). Such behaviors permanently affect companies if 
they continue to influence customers’ perception and reduce opportunities to increase 
customers’ purchase decisions (Bansal & Voyer, 2000; Wirtz et al., 2007). Although 
customers expect some risks associated with service failures, and minor service 
failures might not provoke immediate anger or frustration (Kelley & Davis, 1994), 
loss of customers’ private information increases their privacy concerns and perceived 
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risk, discouraging them from continuing to do business with the companies concerned 
(Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Kim et al., 2008). Therefore, I hypothesize:  
HAo: The announcement of information-security breaches does not influence 
cardholders’ use of compromised credit cards. 
HA1: The announcement of information-security breaches influences cardholders’ use 
of compromised credit cards. 
Previous studies emphasize the importance of switching barriers, or factors that 
make it difficult or costly for customers to change service providers, in determining 
customer retention. The underlying structures constituting switching barriers generally 
include interpersonal relationships, switching costs, and the availability of alternatives 
(Jones et al., 2000; Colgate & Lang, 2001). Interpersonal relationships refer to the 
bonds between customers and service providers, or the shared acknowledgement of 
special affiliations, whose degree determines customers’ decisions to remain in the 
relationship, even if the service received is less than optimal (Czepiel, 1990; Gwinner 
et al., 1998; Molina et al., 2007). Switching costs refer to the psychological, monetary, 
and physical costs associated with changing service providers (Sengupta et al., 1997). 
In exploring the multi-dimensional characteristics of switching costs, Jones et al. 
(2002) classified them into three large categories: continuity, learning, and sunk costs. 
Continuity costs consist of lost performance costs (i.e., benefits lost due to termination 
of service) and uncertainty costs (i.e., perceived risks associated with new service 
providers). Learning costs consist of pre- and post-switching costs (i.e., searching 
costs and time to adjust to new service providers) and setup costs (i.e., filling out 
application forms). Sunk costs include a cost that has already been incurred and efforts 
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to establish relationships with new service providers. Switching costs in general are 
negatively related to switching tendencies by increasing willingness to purchase 
services (Jones et al., 2000) and customers’ dependence on providers (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994), creating customer loyalty (Ping, 1993) and offsetting switching benefits 
(Stigler, 1961). Moreover, several studies suggest that customers continue their 
relationships with current service providers when they perceive no practical 
alternatives (Andreasen, 1985; Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Anderson & Narus, 1990). 
After conducting survey questionnaires of consumers who decided to stay after 
seriously considering switching financial-service providers, Colgate and Lang (2001) 
found that inertia, or customers’ lack of interest or indifference to alternatives, is the 
most significant factor discouraging customers from switching.  
Several studies explored the role of switching barriers in the credit-card 
industry. Ausubel (1991) discusses the prevalence of high search costs in the credit-
card industry, which can plausibly explain card issuers’ tendency to preserve high 
credit-card rates. Ausubel (1991) suggests that credit-card rates were inflexible from 
1982 through 1986 relative to market rates, with one explanation being the high search 
costs associated with customers searching for alternatives (i.e., money, time, and effort 
spent discovering better options and opening new accounts). High search costs 
inherently discourage consumers from switching, enabling credit-card issuers to 
maintain high interest rates and retain customers despite high interest rates. Calem and 
Mester (1995) assert that switching costs are especially high for individuals carrying 
large balances. Using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, Calem and 
Mester (1995) found that high-balance individuals are more likely to be rejected or 
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given less-desirable limits when applying for new credit, making switching costs 
comparatively high. One explanation behind this high level of rejection is that card 
issuers that use debt-to-income ratios to determine credit approval consider 
outstanding debts to be a sign of credit risk when they are unable to determine the 
creditworthiness of cardholders. Moreover, for cardholders whose outstanding 
balances are near liquidity constraints, the costs associated with closing accounts are 
comparatively high because it requires settling existing debts. Finally, frequent card 
usage is generally rewarded with various loyalty programs, such as cash back, accrual 
points, and upgraded services. Consumers who frequently use credit cards are more 
likely to feel locked in because switching requires forgoing loyalty benefits. This 
explanation is supported by Wirtz et al. (2007), who find that cardholders tend to 
increase their use of credit cards if they perceive high switching costs related to 
loyalty programs. Based on this research, I hypothesize the following: 
HBo: Cardholders’ experiences with credit cards do not influence future use of 
compromised credit cards. 
HB1: Cardholders’ experiences with credit cards influence future use of compromised 
credit cards. 
The results in this chapter show that after the announcement of information-
security breaches, customers’ likelihood of closing accounts increases, and that this 
trend continues for several months. Information-security breaches also negatively 
influence use of compromised credit cards by cardholders who keep their accounts, 
especially among those with good credit scores or who are considered to be profitable 
for the company. The findings in this chapter also suggest that positive experiences 
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with credit cards are effective in retaining customers, but that the effect becomes less 
significant when major security breaches occur. Finally, cardholders who use credit 
cards as an extra source of cash show moderate reactions in their use of compromised 
credit cards after breaches. The findings in this study resemble Lee and Lee’s (2012) 
findings of a negative relationship between the perceived usefulness of e-commerce 
websites and online customers’ negative behaviors after information-security 
incidents, although the effect is not statistically significant in their study. The 
limitation of a small sample size is one potential explanation. By using a large dataset, 
this study provides a comprehensive understanding of customer behaviors after major 
information-security breaches. Moreover, by using proprietary credit-card data and an 
event that happened in a natural setting, this study provides empirical evidence of 
customers’ reactions to information-security breaches. Policymakers and managers in 
the credit-card industry can benefit from the findings in this study. 
 
4. Data Description 
The study uses two types of datasets. The first data analyzed in this chapter 
were drawn from one of the compromised Korean card issuers. This proprietary data 
contained credit-card information from 2 million randomly selected accounts. The unit 
of observation is a credit-card account, and each account represented a single monthly 
statement for all cards held by an account owner because cardholders often possess 
multiple credit cards from the same issuer. The dataset consisted of cardholders with 
the last name Kim, which is the most common surname in Korea and is not limited to 
a specific birthplace, occupation, or household members. The behaviors of cardholders 
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in the dataset, therefore, should be representative of the behaviors of cardholders in 
general. The names of account holders were replaced by random numbers and 
anonymized to protect the identities of account holders. The dataset is an unbalanced 
panel covering the sample period from January 2012 through May 2014, including 
January 2014, when the information-security breach was revealed to the public. To be 
included in the sample, the total credit-card balance of an account holder had to be 
more than zero. While the first dataset observed the behaviors of affected individuals, 
the second dataset provided aggregate credit-card usage. The second dataset used in 
this chapter consists of publicly available credit-card data provided by Financial 
Statistics Information System, South Korea’s statistical information provider. 
Financial Statistics Information System provides a large range of Korean statistics, 
including information on credit-card usage at 20 Korean credit-card companies on a 
quarterly basis. I used this public dataset to investigate unique changes in credit-card 
usage among data-leaked companies. Similar to the first dataset, the sample period 
covers January 2012 through June 2014.    
 
5. Methodology 
This study presents two regression models: a logistic model and a regression 
model with an individual fixed effect. The former estimated customers’ likelihood of 
closing accounts during and after the announcement of an information-security breach, 
while the latter estimated the ex-post spending behaviors of those who continue using 
credit cards. The purpose of the logistic model is to determine the effect of the 
information-security breach on the likelihood of exit, as well as factors influencing 
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customers’ exit decisions. The purpose of the fixed-effects regression model is to 
identify factors influencing the spending behaviors of customers who stay with the 
company after the breach.  
 
5.1 Estimation of the Likelihood of Exit 
The logistic regression model is stated in Equation 1: 
[Equation 1] 
 
To estimate the effects of the information breach on exit likelihood, I used a 
logistic model with an individual and month-fixed effect to control for individual 
heterogeneity and seasonality. The dependent variable in the logistic regression is 
dCancel, a binary variable in which 1 indicates “cancelling the credit card within the 
next 30 days,” and 0 indicates “staying with the company for the next 30 days.” 
Occasionally, an account disappears from the dataset, not because the customer 
voluntarily canceled the credit card, but because the credit-card company terminated 
the customer’s account. Involuntary account termination does not reflect willingness 
to exit and, therefore, might cause biased results. Most involuntary terminations occur 
due to inactive accounts with no outstanding balances, so I eliminated cardholders 
whose total balance equaled zero from the sample.  
The vector of control variables, Xit, represents the credit-card information of 
individual i at time t. The control variables include ln(Limit), ln(Spending), 
ln(PastDue), Ratio_Revolving, and dLoan. I listed the variable definitions and mean 
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statistics in Table 3.1. Credit limits are based on credit scores evaluated by card 
issuers that use internal and external sources to examine cardholders’ creditworthiness. 
Credit-card spending includes all credit-card transactions (e.g., card transactions 
through merchant accounts), cash advances, and revolving credit, but excludes card 
loans. Past due balances occur when cardholders do not pay previously charged debt 
in full by the due date. Generally, interest is charged each month on past due balances, 
but the past due balances in the dataset do not include interest or late fees. 
Ratio_Revolving indicates how actively cardholders use deferred-payment methods, 
such as revolving or installment credit. Installment credit is debt made with a specific 
payment plan and paid back evenly over the set period, whereas revolving credit is 
debt made without promising a specific payment date and whose payments can vary. 
In Korea, both deferred-payment methods are commonly used. Ratio_Revolving is 
calculated as the sum of deferred-payment usage divided by the total number of credit-
card swipes each month. A ratio close to 1 indicates that a cardholder makes most 
transactions using revolving credit. While spending levels signal how actively 
cardholders use credit cards, balances themselves do not indicate their purposes in 
using credit cards. Generally, people use credit cards for transactional or borrowing 
purposes, and their responses to breaches can differ depending on the particular 
purposes for which they use credit cards. To distinguish the differences in behaviors, I 
added a dummy variable, dLoan, which equals 1 if a cardholder uses cash advances or 
card loans and 0 otherwise. In Table 3.1, approximately 15 percent of observations in 
the sample use loan services.  
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
  
Mean 
(Std) 
Variable Used Definition 
        
(A) Full Sample 
 
Credit Limit ($) 4,844 ln(Limit) log (Credit limit+1) 
  (4,327)     
Monthly Spending 584 ln(Spending) log (Monthly credit card spending +1) 
  (1,175)     
Past Due ($) >0 715 ln(PastDue) log (Monthly past due balance +1) 
  (1,638)     
Ratio_Revolving 0.37 Ratio_Revolving Number of deferred-payment options 
divided by total credit-card swipes   (0.45)   
dLoan 0.15 dLoan equals 1 if a cardholder uses cash 
advances or card loans and zero 
otherwise 
  (0.36)   
    
# Obs.     51,947,741 
# Individuals     2,077,272 
        
(B) Cardholders whose accounts survived as of May 2014 
 
Credit Limit ($) 5,053 ln(Limit) log (Credit limit+1) 
  (4,434)     
Monthly Spending 636 ln(Spending) log (Monthly credit-card spending +1) 
  (1,213)     
Past Due ($) >0 669 ln(PastDue) log (Monthly past due balance +1) 
  (1,547)     
Ratio_Revolving 0.40 Ratio_Revolving Number of deferred-payment options 
used divided by total credit-card 
swipes equals 1 if a cardholder uses 
cash advances or card loans and 0 
otherwise. 
  (0.46)   
dLoan 0.16 dLoan 
   (0.37)   
    
# Obs.     45,025,055 
# Individuals     1,645,651 
 
For the purposes of this study, exit is defined as the disappearance of an 
account from the dataset as a cardholder cancels a credit card. The dataset contains 
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information on cardholders as of the last day of each month. For an individual who 
reacted immediately to the announcement of the information breach on January 8, 
2014, and settled a credit card during January, the final month of the account in the 
dataset is December 2013. Similarly, for a cardholder who postpones the exit decision 
until February and cancels credit cards in February 2014, the final month appearing in 
the dataset is January 2014. Since the focus of this study is to examine the likelihood 
that December 2013 is the final period, which happens when a cardholder closes his 
account in January 2014, the variable of interest is Dec2013, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for December 2013 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Jan2014, Feb2014, and 
Mar2014 are dummy variables that equal 1 for January, February, and March 2014 
and 0 otherwise, respectively. These variables monitor how the likelihood of exit 
stemming from the information-security breach announcement persists in the 
following months.  
 
5.2 Estimation for Ex-Post Spending Behaviors 
The fixed-effects regression model is stated in Equation 2: 
[Equation 2] 
 
 To estimate whether the information-security breach influences the spending 
behaviors of cardholders who decide to stay with the compromised company, I used a 
fixed-effects regression with a standard error clustered by time. For the dependent 
variable, I used ln(Spending) and ln(Usage) to measure the credit behaviors of 
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individual i at time t. ln(Spending) is the log of monthly spending plus 1 and includes 
all the transactions made through credit cards except for the card loan. ln(Usage) is the 
log of monthly credit-card usage plus 1 and measures the level of transaction 
frequency. The sample population used in this model is cardholders who opened 
accounts before the breach and held them through May 2014. Limiting the sample to 
surviving accounts could cause selection bias, as the cardholders in the sample might 
have a special reason for holding onto their accounts. The observed response then 
might be influenced more by this reason and less by the breach. To ensure that the 
results are consistent throughout the sample, I also estimated the same regression 
model with the full sample. Month and individual dummies were used to control for 
seasonality and individual heterogeneity. The vector of control variables, Xit, is the 
same as the variables used in the logistic regression in Equation 1. 
The fixed-effects regression model estimated the spending behaviors after the 
breach. A motivation for this regression is to verify how spending and use of credit 
cards changed in a month following a major information-security breach. Therefore, 
the variable of interest in this model is Jan2014, a dummy variable that equals one for 
January 2014 and zero otherwise. Similarly, Feb2014, Mar2014, and Apr2014 are 
dummy variables that equal 1 for February, March, and April 2014 and 0 otherwise, 
respectively. These variables monitor how changes in spending behaviors continue in 
the following months. 
 
6. After Information-Security Breach 
6.1. Stock Market and Customer Reactions  
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The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) is a representative stock 
market index of South Korea that lists the index of all the common stocks traded on 
the nation’s stock market. The three compromised credit-card companies are 
subsidiaries of holding companies and are not publicly traded. However, the net 
profits of data-leaked company 1 (hereafter Data Leaked 1) exceeded 90 percent of the 
total net profits of its holding company; therefore, the stock price of the holding 
company should reflect the market response to the compromised company. Similarly, 
data-leaked company 2 (hereafter Data Leaked 2) is a subsidiary of its holding 
company, which holds a 94 percent share in Data Leaked 2. Figure 3.1 depicts the 
daily closing prices of KOSPI financial companies in the banking sector, Data Leaked 
1, and Data Leaked 2 before and after the breach. Figure 3.1 shows a sharp fall in the 
stock prices for both data-leaked companies after the announcement of the 
information-security breach, while the stock price for the KOSPI financial company 
index shows an upward trend during the same period. Specifically, the average stock 
price of Data Leaked 1 decreased by 6.8 percent from January to February 2014, and 
Data Leaked 2 fell by 10 percent during the same period. On the contrary, the average 
stock price on the KOSPI financial company index went up by 5.2 percent from 
January to February 2014.  
Figure 3.2 depicts the balances and growth of quarterly credit-card spending 
provided by the Financial Statistics Information System. This figure shows that after 
the information-security breach, the credit-card industry experienced an overall 
decrease in credit-card usage and an especially strong decrease among compromised 
companies. For example, credit-card balances dropped from US $19 billion to $17 
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billion (-10.5% growth) for Data Leaked 1, from US $14 billion to $13 billion (-7.1% 
growth) for Data Leaked 2, and US $10 billion to $9 billion (-10% growth) for data 
leaked company 3 (hereafter Data Leaked 3). The decrease in credit-card balances 
among the other card issuers is relatively minor, from US $106 billion to US $103 
billion (-2.8% growth).  
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 Figure 3.1: Indexed Stock Prices of Korean Credit-Card Company 
 
Moreover, Figure 3.3 shows the number of accounts that disappeared from the 
proprietary dataset before and after the announcement of the information-security 
breach. For this graph, I used the dataset of Data Leaked 1, in which most customers’ 
information is assumed breached. An account might disappear from the dataset not 
because the cardholder voluntarily closes the account, but because the card issuer 
terminated an inactive account. To lessen the effect of account closures by card 
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issuers, I included only cardholders whose total balances exceeded zero in the sample. 
The number of closed accounts in Figure 3.3 shows that closed accounts tripled at the 
end of January 2014. To verify that this is not a seasonal pattern, I compared this 
number to the number of closed accounts in a previous year in Appendix 3 of Figure 
3A, which shows that the ratio of closed accounts is moderate in all months of 2013, 
but exceptionally high in January and February 2014, suggesting that the information-
security breach drove the higher number of closed accounts in the dataset. 
 
Figure 3.2: Credit Card Spending Before and After the Breach 
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Figure 3.3: Number of Credit-Card Cancellations 
 
6.2. Customers’ Likelihood of Exit 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the logistic regression in Equation 1, with t-
statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by time. In Table 3.2, the 
coefficient of ln(Limit) is negative, which means the cardholders with high credit 
scores have a lower tendency to exit. Similarly, the negative coefficient of 
ln(Spending) indicates that cardholders with high credit-card balances are less likely to 
close accounts. This makes sense since cardholders with large credit-card balances 
tend to have higher switching costs than cardholders with small credit-card balances 
when settling credit-card debts. Moreover, using other debt options, such as deferred-
payment options and card loans, is negatively related to the likelihood of exit, as 
indicated by the negative coefficients of Ratio_Revolving and dLoan. Although 
coefficients in Table 3.2 are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, the 
positive coefficient of Dec2013 suggests that the likelihood of exit increased in the 
month when the information-security breach was first announced, and this trend 
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continued as indicated by the positive coefficients for Jan2014, Feb2014, and 
Mar2014.  
Table 3.2: Results from the Logistic Model 
  Y=dCancel 
ln(Limit) -0.867 
  (-0.01) 
ln(Spending) -1.487 
  (-0.38) 
ln(PastDue) -0.057 
  (-0.05) 
Ratio_Revolving -0.872*** 
  (-2.62) 
dLoan -0.783 
  (-0.40) 
Dec2013 4.681 
  (0.34) 
Jan2014 7.286 
  (1.11) 
Feb2014 7.449 
  (0.66) 
Mar2014 7.842 
  (0.65) 
N 6,865,544 
Month Fixed Yes 
Individual Fixed Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with a statistical significance of p < 0.1,  
p < 0.05 and p <0.01 indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
In Appendix 3, Table 3A presents results of the logistic model in Equation 1 
with interaction terms. The results in Table 3A suggest that the major security failure 
by credit-card companies weakens the impacts of experiences with the company on 
customer retention. The positive coefficients of ln(Spending)* Dec2013 and 
Ratio_Revolving * Dec2013 suggest that there was a disproportionate increase in the 
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likelihood of account closure by cardholders with large credit-card balances or who 
often used deferred-payment options during the first month after the breach. 
Moreover, the probability of exit increases substantially among cardholders with good 
credit scores after information-security breaches, as indicated by the positive 
coefficient in ln(Limit)* Dec2013. One possible explanation for this positive 
coefficient is the aggressive marketing offers by competitors attempting to attract 
creditworthy customers. Interestingly, some loan users’ probability of closing accounts 
remained negative despite such events. This behavior is partly due to the relatively 
high switching costs for cash borrowers and the behaviors of less-creditworthy 
cardholders who rely on card companies as their best source of cash, which promotes 
the tendency to stick to current credit-card companies despite a major security failure.  
 
6.3. Customers’ use of compromised credit cards 
In Table 3.3, I provide the results of the fixed-effects regression with t-
statistics in parentheses. Overall, I found that the data breach had a negative impact on 
cardholders’ use of the affected credit cards. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.3 exhibit 
results from a sub-sample dataset consisting of customers who stayed with the 
company, and columns (3) and (4) exhibit results from a full sample. In column (1) of 
Table 3.3, among individuals who maintained their accounts through May 2014, 
overall credit-card spending decreased during January 2014, when the breach was 
announced, as denoted by the statistically significant coefficient of -0.017 (t-
statistics=-5.90) for Jan2014. The negative coefficient for Jan2014 in column (1) 
implies that even if customers decided to stick with the compromised credit-card 
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company after the breach, they reduced their use of credit cards by 1.7 percent, and 
this pattern continued until February 2014. Although there is a slight recovery in use 
of credit cards in March 2014, spending drastically declined again in April 2014, when 
it was confirmed that stolen data had been misused.  
 
Table 3.3: Results from Fixed-Effects Model 
  
Cardholders whose Account 
Survived as of May 2014 
  Full Sample 
  Y=ln(Spending)   ln(Use)   ln(Spending)   ln(Use) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
ln(Limit) 0.040***   0.150***   0.037***   0.142*** 
  (53.53)   (113.74)   (87.81)   (53.67) 
ln(PastDue) -0.012**   -0.011**   -0.014***   -0.014** 
  (-8.58)   (-9.43)   (-96.75)   (-8.80) 
Ratio_Revolving 0.243***   1.037***   0.241***   1.066*** 
  (49.38)   (78.29)   (52.45)   (186.16) 
dLoan 0.265***   0.283***   0.266***   0.297*** 
  (54.13)   (57.69)   (48.01)   (36.74) 
Jan2014 -0.017**   -0.032   -0.021**   -0.058** 
  (-5.90)   (-1.75)   (-4.98)   (-8.70) 
Feb2014 -0.010**   -0.032*   -0.014**   -0.053*** 
  (-5.60)   (-3.31)   (-5.63)   (-26.47) 
Mar2014 0.002   -0.007   -0.001   -0.021** 
  (0.58)   (-1.90)   (-0.40)   (-8.17) 
Apr2014 -0.019***   -0.061*   -0.020***   -0.066** 
  (-15.74)   (-3.14)   (-42.31)   (-4.73) 
_cons -0.085***   0.151**   -0.076**   0.147** 
  (-10.35)   (5.55)   (-8.76)   (6.41) 
R-Square .659   .75   .668   .763 
N 45,025,055   45,025,055   51,947,741   51,947,741 
Month Fixed Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Individual Fixed Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with a statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p 
<0.01 indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Column (2) in Table 3.3 shows how consumers’ use of credit cards changed 
after the breach. Similar to the results in column (1), the frequency of using credit 
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cards slowly decreased immediately after the announcement of the breach. In April 
2014, decreases in use of credit cards became relatively severe, partly due to the third-
party leak. Results from a full sample in columns (3) and (4) confirmed that the 
coefficients capturing the effects of the breach are consistent with the results in 
columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.3. 
In Appendix 3, Table 3B presents results of the fixed-effects regression in 
Equation 2 with interaction terms. The coefficients for the interaction variables --  
including ln(Limit)*Jan2014, ln(PastDue)* Jan2014, and Ratio_Revolving* Jan2014 -
- are all negative. These results imply that the decrease was especially strong among 
cardholders who have good credit scores, carry past due balances, or actively use 
deferred-payment options. This change is especially undesirable for companies that 
heavily depend on profits from revolving interest and late fees because continuous 
decreases in the use of services may result in more severe, negative effects on 
management. Finally, in January 2014, when the breach was announced, it impacted 
loan usage as suggested by the negative coefficient of -0.004 (t-statistic=-1.42) for 
dLoan*Jan2014. However, the effect seems short-lived because loan users continued 
to use card loans, as indicated by the statistically significant and positive coefficient of 
dLoan*Mar2014 and dLoan*Apr2014. 
 
6.4. Difference in Differences 
The data used in this chapter came from Data Leaked 1, where most customer 
information is assumed to have been breached since it was announced that nearly 20 
million individuals were affected by the breach. Therefore, results in Table 3.2 and 
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Table 3.3 show behaviors of likely affected customers after the breach. Although a 
significant change in the use of credit cards among affected cardholders implies an 
impact from the breach, results in this chapter carry inherent challenges in 
identification, as behaviors of unaffected customers were not examined due to data 
limitations. To lessen the problem caused by identification and to strengthen the 
associations between the information-security breach and the changes in credit-card 
balances, I estimated a fixed-effects regression model in Equation 3 using the dataset 
from the Financial Statistics Information System. The sample period covers January 
2012 through June 2014, and there are 20 credit-card issuers owned by commercial 
banks, specialty banks, local banks, and credit-card companies.  Equation 3 is stated as 
follows:  
[Equation 3] 
 
 
 
A dependent variable used in Equation 3 is ln(Spending), a log of total credit-
card spending, plus one. A variable Qtr1_2014 presents a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the period is in the first quarter of 2014, and zero otherwise. A variable dLeaki is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for the data-leaked companies and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, a variable Qtr2_2014 presents a dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
second quarter of 2014, and zero otherwise. GDP Growth indicates a quarterly growth 
of Korean GDP. Company and quarter dummies are used to control for company-
specific characteristics and seasonality. The year dummy is excluded in this regression 
because it could capture the effect of the breach. Figure 3B in Appendix 3 shows the 
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quarterly growth of average spending. Compared with periods during the 2008 
financial crisis, variations during the sample periods were relatively minor and similar 
to variations in non-crisis periods.  
 
Table 3.4: Fixed-Effects Regression Using Publicly Available Data 
  
Period: January 2012-May 2014 
  
Y=ln(Spending) 
Qtr1_2014 -0.025 
  (-1.52) 
Qtr2_2014 0.005 
  (0.19) 
Qtr1_2014*dLeak -0.025 
  (-1.10) 
Qtr2_2014*dLeak -0.044* 
  (-2.08) 
GDP_Growth 0.043 
  (0.98) 
_cons 14.083*** 
  (386.81) 
R-Square .115 
N 200 
Number of data-leaked companies 3 
Number of card issuers in the sample 20 
Quarter Fixed Yes 
Company Fixed Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p 
<0.01 indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 3.4 displays the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effect regression. A 
small sample size makes several coefficients in Table 3.4 statistically less meaningful, 
but the coefficient in Qtr1_2014*dLeak and Qtr2_2014*dLeak suggested a decrease in 
the use of compromised credit cards. Specifically, the use of credit cards issued by 
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data-leaked companies decreased by 2.5 percent, more than the rest of the companies 
during the first quarter of 2014. In the second quarter of 2014, when additional third-
party leaks were announced, the decreased use of compromised credit cards reached 
4.3 percent, as denoted by the statistically significant coefficient of -0.044 (t-statistic=-
2.08) in Qtr2_2014*dLeak.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 Today, businesses collect and use considerable amounts of customer 
information to establish strong bonds with current customers and attract new 
customers. However, the results in this study show that utilizing customer information 
can be a double-edged sword if companies neglect information security. This study 
used proprietary credit-card data to empirically investigate the impact of an 
information-security breach that compromised the private information of 
approximately 20 million cardholders. The study first examined whether the breach 
affected customers’ exit likelihood, then explored whether the breach affected credit-
card usage among individuals who remained customers of compromised companies. 
The findings in this study provide many useful insights. Specifically, information 
security breaches motivate customers’ intentions to leave compromised companies, 
and this trend persisted for several months in this test case. The findings also confirm 
that previous experiences with the company have prohibitive effects on customers’ 
exit decisions, but the impact becomes less effective at keeping customers when a 
major security failure happens. Moreover, although some customers remained loyal to 
compromised companies and decided to continue being customers, retaining accounts 
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does not guarantee continued use of services because customers reduce use of 
compromised credit cards after breaches. Decreased service use is especially 
challenging for companies whose profits largely depend on interest fees because the 
number of customers who actively use deferred-payment options or carry past due 
balances also has decreased significantly. 
The stolen data were sold to a loan company as a marketing tool to approach 
cash borrowers. Ironically, cardholders with loans who were supposedly the major 
targets of this crime were the most lenient in how they reacted to the breach. This 
response was partly due to high switching costs because closing accounts requires 
settling existing debts. The study contributes to knowledge on information-security 
breaches, particularly those involving loss of customer information, as well as 
customer reactions to major security failures. The findings in this chapter can help 
policymakers and risk managers in industries in which customer information plays a 
pivotal role in growing businesses. Due to data limitations, this research carries 
inherent challenges in identification because the study examined the behaviors mostly 
of affected cardholders. Future research can benefit from a more robust dataset. 
Moreover, understanding the various incentives that affect cardholders’ decisions 
during and after security breaches could make for an intriguing follow-up study.  
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APPENDIX 3:  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES 
 
Table 3A: Results from the Logistic Model with Interactions  
  Y=dCancel 
ln(Limit) -0.884 
  (-0.01) 
ln(Spending) -1.817 
  (-0.46) 
ln(Overdue) -0.068 
  (-0.05) 
Ratio_Revolving -0.970 
  (-1.45) 
dLoan -0.764 
  (-0.41) 
Dec2013 2.630*** 
  (4.15) 
  ln(Limit)* Dec2013 0.238 
  (0.14) 
  ln(Spending)* Dec2013 1.388 
  (0.53) 
  ln(Overdue)* Dec2013 0.004 
  (0.00) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Dec2013 0.630 
  (0.24) 
  dLoan* Dec2013 -0.008 
  (-0.01) 
Jan2014 4.830 
  (0.23) 
  ln(Limit)* Jan2014 0.296 
  (0.16) 
  ln(Spending)* Jan2014 1.392* 
  (1.72) 
  ln(Overdue)* Jan2014 0.055 
  (0.02) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Jan2014 0.790 
  (0.29) 
  dLoan* Jan2014 -0.216 
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  (-0.06) 
Feb2014 4.959 
  (1.21) 
  ln(Limit)* Feb2014 0.308 
  (0.16) 
  ln(Spending)* Feb2014 1.260 
  (1.54) 
  ln(Overdue)* Feb2014 0.055 
  (0.02) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Feb2014 0.814 
  (0.31) 
  dLoan* Feb2014 -0.304 
  (-0.07) 
Mar2014 5.440 
  (1.13) 
  ln(Limit)* Mar2014 0.299 
  (0.14) 
  ln(Spending)* Mar2014 1.171*** 
  (3.47) 
  ln(Overdue)* Mar2014 0.067 
  (0.01) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Mar2014 0.743 
  (0.25) 
  dLoan* Mar2014 -0.336*** 
  (-4.79) 
N 6,865,544 
Month Fixed Yes 
Individual Fixed Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 3B: Results from Fixed-Effects Model with Interactions 
  
Cardholders whose Account Survived 
as of May 2014 
Full Sample 
  Y=ln(Spending) ln(Usage) ln(Spending) ln(Usage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Limit) 0.043*** 0.154*** 0.039*** 0.144*** 
  (20.03) (25.76) (18.64) (25.63) 
ln(PastDue) -0.011** -0.010** -0.013*** -0.013** 
  (-7.28) (-4.57) (-18.06) (-4.82) 
Ratio_Revolving 0.244*** 1.034*** 0.241*** 1.064*** 
  (50.49) (85.57) (51.27) (185.41) 
dLoan 0.264*** 0.277*** 0.265*** 0.292*** 
  (54.39) (65.87) (48.10) (34.17) 
Jan2014 0.040 0.048 0.027* 0.002 
  (2.85) (0.98) (3.94) (0.09) 
  ln(Limit)* Jan2014 -0.007* -0.010 -0.006* -0.008 
  (-3.16) (-2.14) (-3.83) (-2.73) 
  ln(PastDue)* Jan2014 -0.002* -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-3.08) (-1.28) (-1.12) (-0.05) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Jan2014 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 
  (-2.13) (-0.13) (-1.43) (0.12) 
  dLoan* Jan2014 -0.004 0.021 -0.003 0.025 
  (-1.42) (1.22) (-1.17) (1.33) 
Feb2014 0.080** 0.097 0.063** 0.051 
  (5.25) (2.38) (7.81) (2.64) 
  ln(Limit)* Feb2014 -0.011** -0.017* -0.009** -0.014** 
  (-5.06) (-3.55) (-6.56) (-4.80) 
  ln(PastDue)* Feb2014 -0.003** -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-4.80) (-2.30) (-2.01) (-0.52) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Feb2014 -0.008* 0.010 -0.006 0.009 
  (-2.97) (0.75) (-2.36) (0.56) 
  dLoan* Feb2014 0.009 0.040 0.009 0.039 
  (2.70) (2.29) (2.77) (2.21) 
Mar2014 0.060* 0.066 0.044** 0.024 
  (4.21) (1.81) (5.97) (1.22) 
  ln(Limit)* Mar2014 -0.008* -0.012 -0.006* -0.008 
  (-3.45) (-2.41) (-4.22) (-2.65) 
  ln(PastDue)* Mar2014 -0.005** -0.011** -0.004* -0.010 
  (-8.32) (-7.51) (-4.03) (-2.35) 
  Ratio_Revolving* 
Mar2014 
0.001 0.040* 0.003 0.036 
  (0.47) (2.97) (0.98) (2.61) 
  dLoan* Mar2014 0.019** 0.063* 0.019** 0.060* 
  (5.07) (3.29) (5.34) (3.25) 
Apr2014 0.052 0.003 0.037* -0.032 
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  (2.84) (0.06) (3.45) (-0.99) 
  ln(Limit)* Apr2014 -0.009* -0.011 -0.007** -0.007 
  (-4.00) (-2.11) (-4.98) (-1.94) 
  ln(PastDue)* Apr2014 -0.005*** -0.007** -0.004* -0.006 
  (-11.04) (-5.38) (-3.98) (-1.57) 
  Ratio_Revolving* Apr2014 -0.004 0.037 -0.003 0.031 
  (-1.65) (2.81) (-1.21) (2.54) 
  dLoan* Apr2014 0.013* 0.058* 0.012* 0.053* 
  (3.51) (3.05) (3.65) (3.05) 
_cons -0.107** 0.121 -0.091** 0.130 
  (-7.67) (2.00) (-5.70) (2.88) 
R-Square .66 .75 .668 .763 
N 45,025,055 45,025,055 51,947,741 51,947,741 
Month Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with statistical significance of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p <0.01 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Figure 3A: Comparison of Closed Credit Card Accounts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B: Growth of Average Credit Card Spending 
 104 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, J. C. & Narus, J. A., 1990. A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer 
Firm Working Partnerships. Journal of Marketing, 54(1), pp. 42-58. 
Andreasen, A. R., 1985. Consumer Responses to Dissatisfaction in Loose Monopolies. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 12(2), pp. 135-141. 
Ausubel, L. M., 1991. The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market. The 
American Economic Review, 81(1), p. 50. 
Bansal, H. S. & Voyer, P. A., 2000. Word-of-Mouth Processes within a Services 
Purchase Decision Context. Journal of Service Research, 3(2), pp. 166-77. 
Bendapudi, N. & Berry, L. L., 1997. Customers' motivations for maintaining 
relationships with service providers. Journal of Retailing, 73(1), pp. 15-37. 
Blodgett, J. G., Wakefield, K. L. & Barnes, J. H., 1995. The effects of customer 
service on consumer complaining behavior. Journal of Services Marketing, 
9(4), pp. 31-42. 
Bunker, M. P. & Ball, D., 2008. Causes and consequences of grudge-holding in 
service relationships. The Journal of Services Marketing, 22(1), pp. 37-47. 
Calem, P. S. & Mester, L. J., 1995. Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-
Card Interest Rates. The American Economic Review, 85(5), pp. 1327-1336. 
Campbell, K., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P. & Zhou, L., 2003. The economic cost of 
publicly announced information security breaches: empirical evidence from the 
stock market. Journal of Computer Security, Volume 11, p. 431–448. 
Colgate, M. & Lang, B., 2001. Switching barriers in consumer markets: an 
investigation of the financial services industry. Journal of Consumer 
Marketing, 18(4), pp. 332-347. 
Culnan, M. J. & Armstrong, P. K., 1999. Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural 
Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation. Organization 
Science, 10(1), pp. 104-115. 
Czepiel, J. A., 1990. Service encounters and service relationships: Implications for 
research. Journal of Business Research, 20(1), pp. 13-21. 
Garg, A., Curtis, J. & Halper, H., 2003. Quantifying the financial impact of IT security 
breaches. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(2), pp. 74-83. 
 105 
Gwinner, K. R., Gremler, D. D. & Bitner, M. J., 1998. Relational benefits in services 
industries: the customer's perspective. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 26(2), pp. 101-114. 
Haj-Salem, N. & Chebat, J.-C., 2013. The double-edged sword: The positive and 
negative effects of switching costs on customer exit and revenge. Journal of 
Business Research, 67(6). 
Jones, M. A., Mothersbaugh, D. L. & Beatty, S. E., 2000. Switching Barriers and 
Repurchase Intentions in Services. Journal of Retailing, Volume 76, pp. 259-
74. 
Jones, M. A., Mothersbaugh, D. L. & Beatty, S. E., 2002. Why customers stay: 
measuring the underlying dimensions of services switching costs and 
managing their differential strategic outcomes. Journal of Business Research, 
Volume 55, p. 441 – 450. 
Kannan, K., Rees, J. & Sridhar, S., 2007. Market Reactions to Information Security 
Breach Announcements: An Empirical Analysis. International Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, 12(1), pp. 69-91. 
Kelley, S. W. & Davis, M. A., 1994. Antecedents to Customer Expectations for 
Service Recovery. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 22(1), pp. 
52-61. 
Kerr, S. & Dunn, L., 2008. Consumer Search Behavior in the Changing Credit Card 
Market. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 26(3), pp. 345-353. 
Kim, C., Kim, S., Im, S. & Shin, C., 2003. The effect of attitude and perception on 
consumer complaint intentions. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 20(4), pp. 
352-371. 
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L. & Rao, H. R., 2008. A trust-based consumer decision-making 
model in electronic commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their 
antecedents. Decision support systems, 44(2), pp. 544-564. 
Lee, M. & Lee, J., 2012. The impact of information security failure on customer 
behaviors: A study on a large-scale hacking incident on the internet. 
Information Systems Frontiers, 14(2), p. 375–393. 
Malhotra, A. & Malhotra, C. K., 2011. Evaluating Customer Information Breaches as 
Service Failures:An Event Study Approach. Journal of Service Research, 
Volume 14, pp. 44-59. 
Molina, A., Martín-Consuegra, D. & Esteban, Á ., 2007. Relational benefits and 
customer satisfaction in retail banking. The International Journal of Bank 
Marketing, 25(4), pp. 253-271. 
 106 
Morgan, R. M. & Hunt, S. D., 1994. The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), pp. 20-38. 
Ping, R. A., 1993. The effects of satisfaction and structural constraints on retailer 
exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect. Journal of Retailing, 69(3), 
pp. 320-352. 
Sengupta, S., Krapfel, R. E. & Pusateri, M. A., 1997. Switching Costs in Key Account 
Relationships. The Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, 17(4), 
pp. 9-16. 
Singh, J., 1990. Voice, exit, and negative word-of-mouth behaviors: An investigation 
across three service categories. Journal of the academy of Marketing Science, 
Volume 18, pp. 1-15. 
Stango, V., 2000. Competition and pricing in the credit card market. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 82(3), p. 499–508. 
Stango, V., 2002. Pricing with consumer switching costs: evidence from the credit 
card market. THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, L(4), pp. 
475-492. 
Stigler, G. J., 1961. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 
69(3), pp. 213-225. 
Tsai, M.-H., Liao, C. & Hsieh, R. G., 2014. CUSTOMER DISSEMINATION OF 
NEGATIVE WORD-OF-MOUTH: INFLUENCE OF EXPECTED OR 
UNEXPECTED EVENTS. Social Behavior and Personality, 42(10), pp. 1675-
1688. 
Wirtz, J., Lwin, M. O. & Williams, J. D., 2007 . Causes and consequences of 
consumer online privacy concern. International Journal of Service Industry , 
18(4), pp. 326-348. 
Wirtz, J., Mattila, A. S. & Lwin, M. O., 2007. How effective are loyalty reward 
programs in driving share of wallet?. Journal of service Research, 9(4), pp. 
327-334. 
 
107 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
 
 This chapter summarizes this dissertation, discusses the main findings, 
comments on the limitations of the current work, and outlines directions for future 
work. The main focus of this dissertation is consumers’ behavioral changes in 
response to unpredictable events. This examination of consumers’ behavioral changes 
uses unique credit card data from a large credit card company in Korea. The events 
analyzed comprise government nudging policy, public grief stemming from a human-
made calamity, and high-profile information security breaches. All these events—new 
initiatives from policymakers, tragic accidents that kill innocent people, and theft of 
personal information—come as unpleasant surprises but occur regularly. Despite the 
significance and pervasiveness of such events, little literature empirically examines 
their effect on consumer behavior. This dissertation is motivated by an interest in how 
the worst-case scenarios in daily life affect consumer behavior. In a similar vein, a 
deep understanding of the outcomes of environmental changes can aid preparation for 
future events. Thus, the main contribution of this dissertation is to offer empirical 
evidence on how consumer behaviors are closely tied to events in real-world settings. 
Chapter 2 discusses the effect of unpaid debt reminders on credit card spending 
behaviors. Comparing credit card spending by cardholders who receive and do not 
receive unpaid debt reminders shows that informing consumers about unpaid debt 
balances can lead to more responsible spending. While the literature on financial 
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knowledge and credit card borrowings focuses on the costs associated with credit card 
uses (Warwick & Mansfield, 2000; Lewis & Venrooij, 1995), the results in this 
chapter suggest the importance of recognizing one’s own debt situations in credit card 
usage, indicating an opportunity for financial education. In addition, these findings 
point to the potential of nudging as an extension of policy. Although this unusually 
rich set of dataset on credit card usage lessens potential measurement errors, the scope 
of the analysis is limited to cardholders actively using credit cards. For cardholders 
who use credit cards occasionally, the extended intervals between purchases could 
reduce their ability to remember unpaid debt balances, and in this context, the effects 
of reminders could be counterintuitive. Future research, therefore, could extend the 
scope of analysis to cardholders with various backgrounds. Moreover, text alerts with 
other reminders, such as information on credit card interest and fees, could be tested. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether emotional distress over national tragedy 
influences credit card usage. The national tragedy examined in this chapter is the 
Sewol disaster, which killed 261 high school students on a field trip. Most victims are 
from Ansan, so the cardholders are segmented by physical distance to the victims as a 
proxy for the level of emotional distress. The results from fixed-effects regression 
show that the disaster resulted in, on average, reduced credit card spending by 4 
percent among those living closest to the victims’ families or neighbors and by 1.6 
percent among residents of the same city as the victims. These findings suggest that 
this disaster caused negative emotions in the public that affected credit card spending. 
This connection highlights the importance of understanding public sentiment during 
times of grief and its impact on consumer behaviors. Although this study assumes that 
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grief is the main emotion affecting consumer behavior, the death of neighbors 
certainly can create many differently feelings, not only sadness. Future qualitative 
research could explore the different effects of emotions on consumer behavior during 
grief. Moreover, monitoring the persistence of these effects could help policymakers 
prepare for the aftermath of disasters. 
 Chapter 4 provides insights into customers’ continued use of services when 
companies fail to protect customer information. In this chapter, a dataset from one 
data-leaked credit card company is used to estimate changes in the likelihood of 
canceling credit cards and spending by customers affected by a major information 
security breach. The findings indicate that a massive information security breach 
increase the likelihood of account closure and reduces the use of compromised credit 
cards. Moreover, the effect of past experiences with the company becomes less 
significant to customer retention after a major security failure.  
These findings contribute to knowledge of information security breaches, 
which are useful for policy makers and risk managers seeking to achieve stability after 
data breaches. The proprietary dataset analyzed in this chapter reveals behavior mostly 
by affected customers, so this study has inherent identification challenges. To mitigate 
this problem, publicly available credit card data are used to examine whether the 
spending changes among the data-leaked credit card companies are unique. Although 
the results from fixed-effects regression suggest a disproportionate decrease in credit 
card use among the data-leaked companies after the breach, an explicit comparison of 
the behaviors of affected and unaffected consumers could better explain the impact of 
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the beach on consumer behavior. Follow-up studies could benefit from a more robust 
dataset.  
Consumer behaviors are determined by many movements in society, not only 
by factors such as prices, product attributes, and economic conditions but also by 
government initiatives to affect behavioral changes and sometimes by heart-breaking 
events. This complexity makes theoretical explanations of consumer behaviors 
insufficient in many cases. A careful analysis of consumer data should provide ideas 
about collective consciousness, unexpected trends, and social interests. Although the 
increasing popularity of big data drives growing interest in consumer behaviors among 
marketers, policy makers show little interest. Efforts to understand consumer 
behaviors in various dimensions and the development of privacy-protected consumer 
data could aid policy making more broadly.  
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